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When we develop accounts of the good life we inevitably need to work with simplified 
images of human beings so as to limit the ideas our account must grapple with. Yet, in the 
process of this simplification we often exclude certain types of agents from having moral status 
because our image of humanity does not take their key features into account. The problems 
created by this type of simplification are very apparent when we consider how virtue ethics deals 
with the lives of people with Intellectual Disabilities. Since virtue ethics focuses on reason it 
very quickly excludes people with limited intellectual functioning from being moral agents who 
have access to the happy life. In this thesis I explore this problem of exclusion further and 
present a revised set of virtues based on the Capabilities Approach by Martha Nussbaum. By 
developing this new focus for virtue ethics I create a virtue-based approach to the good life that 
is not only more inclusive of agents with limited intellectual functioning but also represents a 
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Ethical systems often work with an idealized version of humanity. After all, if we are to 
have any theories at all we cannot include all of the diversity that is a part of human life. 
Therefore, as we create moral theories we choose some characteristics of human beings and then 
generalize from there. However, this need for idealization leads to some difficulties when we 
take these idealized theories and apply them to real agents. These people of flesh and blood are 
neither so perfect nor as simple as the ones we use to develop our theories.  
 One of the biggest idealizing assumptions in moral theories that does not apply to a wide 
range of real agents is the idea that human beings are ideally rational. Indeed, starting with the 
Enlightenment and its return to the ancient focus on the human being as a rational man there 
have been a great many ethical theories that took reason as a given and then further promoted it 
to the status of the main component of human identity. In the case of Kant, Rawls, and Mill, as 
well as those who followed after them, this is certainly true.  
 This focus on reason ignores emotion and the relational aspects of the human being have 
been a key source of complaint from Feminist thinkers.
1
 Since rational humans were regarded as 
the key moral agents for so long women became associated with emotion and irrationality an so 
were devalued and excluded from moral life. With the rise of feminism and the fight for equality 
over the last century many thinkers have questioned this focus on reason since it isolates and 
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Belknap Press. 103-105. See also: Rosemarie Tong and Nancy Williams. 2011 "Feminist 






ignores many other features of human beings which, if emphasised, would include more 
considerations in moral life.  
 This issue is also of utmost importance when we try to find a place for people with 
mental and physical disabilities in our moral theories. Since these agents do not have minds and 
bodies that function in ways that are typical or perfect our ethical theories are often a poor fit for 
such persons or leave them out entirely.  Many disabled agents do not have the intellectual 
capacity that is so important to the image of human beings used in the major moral theories.  
 A key example of this problem comes in Virtue Ethics. Virtue ethics is a moral theory 
with a specific idea about what is most important in making someone a human being. It 
emphasises the development of reason and dispositions of character needed in order to reach the 
good life. In this account it is only through a life of reason with the proper rational dispositions 
to act and proper feelings about our actions that a person can have a successful and happy life. 
Without reason one is not a fully developed human being and therefore will never be truly 
happy. 
 When this theory is applied to agents it quickly becomes clear that there are many agents 
who are not sufficiently rational to live up to this ideal. Just as women were excluded from many 
ideals of the human person so too virtue ethics creates a picture of human beings where those 
that lack the intellectual capacities needed to have the reason and dispositions discussed above 
are not thought of or included. Since disabled agents are not the type of people virtue ethics 






 It is this problematic intersection between virtue ethics and people with disabilities that 
will be the focus of this work. Chapter 1 defines in more detail the kinds of disabilities that cause 
this problem in more detail. Chapter 2 shows how these agents are excluded by the common 
standards of virtue ethics. Finally, Chapter 3 presents a modified set of standards for virtue ethics 
that create a place for disabled agents in this ethical framework. I will show that not only is it 
problematic that virtue ethics excludes agents with intellectual disabilities but also that its narrow 
focus on reason does not present a sufficiently broad picture of human life as a whole. By 
revising the standards for virtue ethics I will develop a virtue based approach that not only avoids 
the problematic focus on reason present in common accounts but also presents a richer picture of 
what it is to live a good human life.  
However, as noted above this problem of an overly narrow focus on reason is not unique 
to virtue ethics. Since this problem is present to varying degrees in all of the major ethical 
theories, before turning to the main business of this thesis I will first show how this focus on 
reason and the existence of people with disabilities presents a problem for Utilitarianism, Kant’s 
Deontology and the Rawls’ contemporary interpretation of Kant. Although virtue ethics has 
many problems of its own in relation to disabled agents some of the problems this theory has in 
accommodating such agents are also similar to those experienced by other theories and so 
examining other theories can provide some context for what will be said later on about virtue 
ethics.  
I: UTILITARIANISM 
 Utilitarianism as set out by J.S. Mill is an account that evaluates actions based on the idea 





calls the Greatest Happiness Principle.
2
 In this theory the morally right action is defined as the 
one that maximizes overall pleasure. Although one is always completing this analysis from one’s 
own perspective the pleasures and pains of all people are evaluated equally. So, what matters 




 Given its emphasis on pleasure one might think that utilitarianism was not vulnerable to 
the criticism that it was overly rationalistic or that it would exclude anyone who could feel 
pleasure or pain. After all, if pleasure and pain are what matter most then surely anyone who 
feels these sensations would have a place in this morality. Yet, Mill’s account distinguishes 
between higher and lower pleasures. As far as Mill is concerned all pleasures are not equal. The 
first sort of pleasures a human can experience are the lower pleasures we share with ―beasts‖. 
These are things that please our ―animal appetites‖ for food, sensory pleasure and physical 
comfort.
4
 However, Mill does not think that any human being would really ―consent to be 
changed into …lower animals for the fullest allowance of the beast’s pleasure‖ as ―a being of 
higher faculty takes more to make him happy‖
 
than an animal does.
 5
  
 Mill therefore introduces the idea of higher pleasures that engage these higher faculties. 
These pleasures are the pleasures of the intellect and are only possible for human beings.
6
 By this 
he means to pick out pleasure that we get from things like literature, the arts, philosophy and 
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friendship and games of wit. For Mill this is a better sort of pleasure and is of a higher quality 
than the lower pleasures because it engages our rational faculties. Indeed, he goes so far as to say 
that it would be better to be ―Socrates unsatisfied than a fool or a pig satisfied‖.
7
 In other words, 
if we have the choice of being satisfied by the lower pleasures or waiting to be satisfied with the 
higher pleasures we should hold out for the higher pleasures every time.  
 Given this aspect of Mill’s account the Greatest Happiness principle provides a very 
specific answer about what we should value and where we should direct rescores.  Although the 
pleasure and pain of every person matters higher pleasures will be of the most use in promoting 
the greatest happiness for all since these pleasures count for more than lower pleasures do. 
Therefore, on this account we should direct more resources to promoting the higher pleasures. 
Since people who have an impairment to their reason can’t experience most of these pleasures 
they will be de facto excluded from many aspects of this account’s good life given that so much 
value is places on the higher pleasures. While this does not mean that this theory advocates doing 
harm or causing pain to disabled persons it certainly creates a situation where their needs will not 
be valued in the same way as the needs of average persons.  
II)KANT’S DEONTOLOGY 
 Approaching ethics from a different angle we have Kant’s deontology. In his approach 
the key to morality is the good will and human dignity through autonomy.
8
 Since human beings 
have the ability to be rational their worth comes from their ability to use this reason to participate 
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in moral life. 
9
 Indeed, Kant says that ―to produce a will that is good in itself reason [is] 
absolutely necessary‖ and that this good will and the reason that backs it are ―the highest good of 
all the rest‖.
10
 It is from this foundation that Kant develops his account of the universal moral 
law, the Categorical Imperative.  
 Apart from any problems with this imperative we already have a problem with respect to 
the place of disabled persons in this system. Here again human reason and intellectual ability is a 
huge part of how we determine what is morality. However, reason in this complex sense of the 
training of the will to follow duty and have the ―respect for the moral law‖
11
 that is so important 
to Kant are not open to many people with intellectual disabilities. Many of them just do not have 
minds that are able to think in the abstract ways needed to understand, apply and then 
universalize these general principles or to understand the difference between duty and other 
motives for acting. They may also be unable to understand the idea of a good will as the ability 
to guide one’s actions by the rational moral law. Therefore, Kant potentially excludes them from 
moral life and moral worth from the outset. Since for Kant the only thing that is morally worthy 
is a good will
12
 and these people do not have this ability or connection to the moral law they can 
never be truly good no matter what they do. They just do not have the right sort of minds to be 
moral agents.  
 Additionally, Kant’s imperatives also pose a risk to the status of the intellectually 
disabled as moral agents. Given that such persons lack the rationality needed to develop maxims 
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and assess imperatives, they are not able to participate in moral life and so do not have objective 
value in and of them. What this means for intellectually disabled agents is that, unlike fully 
rational human beings, they may not have an intrinsic value or dignity and only need to be 
afforded moral concern when situational and conditional factors would make this a duty.  Like 
animals these agents are not fully rational so they are also outside the realm of moral concern. 
Not only are they unable to be moral agents but they also do not have any moral status in the 
decision making process of other agents. Indeed, Kant goes so far as to say that any being 
without reason is ―a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational 
animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one's discretion.‖
13
   
 This rather chilling statement excluding non-rational beings from moral concern for Kant 
follows from his emphasis on reason as the key feature of duty and moral life. However, this sort 
of exclusion seems mistaken if we are focused on inclusive ethics given how much impact 
excluding non-rational agents from moral concern would have on the moral status of people with 
intellectual disabilities and others who would be excluded from moral life by this judgment. For 
this exclusion to be unproblematic it needs far more discussion and justification than it is 
afforded by Kant. Although he does say that we ought to treat such beings humanely in order to 
be good people more than this minimum standard is needed if we are to create an appropriately 
respectful ethical system.  
 In general, as was the case with utilitarianism, people with intellectual disabilities are 
problematic for Kant given his focus on reason and its connection to the moral life. Just like in 
all of the above cases people with intellectual disabilities are excluded from moral life with very 
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little discussion or consideration. Although modern advocates of disability rights would never 
want to say, as Kant does, that they should be excluded from moral consideration it might 
perhaps be appropriate in some cases to say that Intellectually Disabled people are excluded from 
being actors in the moral life. However, if we are to resolve this problem much more discussion 
needs to be had about it. In all of these cases Intellectually Disabled people pose a problem 
simply because they are forgotten and so the archetypes of people used in these theories leave 
them out of their consideration.   
III) JUSTICE THEORY 
 in his modern adaptation of Kant’s foundations Rawls develops social principles based on 
justice understood as fairness.
14
 According to this theory a society should be governed by 
Principles of Justice which would be agreed on by a group of rational and equally able agents. 
Furthermore, these rational agents would develop these principles from behind a Veil of 
Ignorance these agents are also completely self-interested in the sense that they are not charged 
with looking out for the interests of any other person. Therefore, although they do not know what 
their social status will be and therefore will be likely to look out for the person in the lowest 
social position they will also imagine every agent to be like themselves in their level of ability to 
contribute to society.  
Although Rawls is seeking fairness here this already leaves out agents with rational 
impairments as they will largely be unable to participate in this model from the outset. This 
model places a strong emphasis on reason from the beginning and so sets out standards that are 
out of reach of many impaired agents. 
15
 Also, since this model sets out participating agents as 
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contributing equally to society and envisioning other agents as being the same this exclusion 
presents a problem with the scope of contract ethics and its original position since there is little 
place in this model for agents with different than average abilities.  
 If leaving the disabled out of the original position seems strange then on the surface it 
looks like the rest of the theory might be able to salvage a place for the disabled. After setting out 
the original position listed above Rawls then sets out the principles of justice. Here he says that 
society should be set up in such a way that every person has access to as much liberty as is 
possible without denying the same right to others. In addition to this Liberty principles he also 
states in the Difference Principle that all goods are to be distributed equally. However, inequality 
would be permitted if the inequality makes the person in the weakest social position better off.
16
 
 This set of principles would seem to help make a place for disabled people in society. 
After all, they would likely be disadvantaged enough by their condition to be benefited by the 
redistribution of goods in the manner set out by the difference principle. However, even this 
encounters problems because of the way Rawls construes society. As Nussbaum points out, as 
far as Rawls is concerned the bounds of society only include ―fully cooperating members of 
society‖ who were able to make a contract with each other as the rules were set up in the original 
position.
17
 Therefore, since the intellectually disabled are unable to participate in this process as 
listed above even these criteria do not make a place for them. Here again, the focus on the life of 
the mind and on reason can potentially make this theory too exclusive for people with 
intellectual disabilities to have a place in it. 
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 Scanlon suggests that if we were to implement the ideals of Rawls’ theory we could 
establish trustees to speak for the interests of the disabled within the contract. By having a fully 
functioning person who can enter into the contract on the behalf of the disabled person we are 
able to make their needs part of the contract. This for Scanlon is a solution that avoids the above 
problem. The trustee makes the needs of the other person known and speaks for them as part of 
the contract and so they are afforded a place in the society that they would not have otherwise. 
18
 
Although Scanlon sees this as a complete solution, this idea of a trustee still holds many 
problems for disabled agents. Although giving them a trustee is better than the alternative it still 
does not deal with the fact that in this system the disabled are not fully participating agents since 
they do not fit the paradigm of self-interest and full functioning that underpins contract ethics. 
So, while the trustee argument provides a working solution for this problem in contract ethics it 
does not deal with the deeper problem of the status of disabled agents in contractarian ethics. 
Therefore, it is at best a partial solution as the status of the disabled is still a problem for those 
who practice contract ethics.  
IV)FROM CONTEXT TO PROBLEM 
Having indicated how an overemphasis on reason is a general problem for moral theories, 
I will now move away from this general context and look at the specific issue of the 
overemphasis on reason present in virtue ethics and how this narrow focus excludes agents with 
intellectual disabilities. Although virtue ethics has some of the same problems of focus as the 
theories described above its emphasis on reason happen in a different way than for any other 
moral theory. What the above discussion shows is that this problem of an overemphasis on 
reason and a narrow view of humanity is far from unique to virtue ethics.  
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It is this problem in the specific context of virtue ethics which I will set out to solve in 
subsequent chapters. I will first spend some more time defining the impairments and disabilities I 
see as posing the most problems for virtue ethics. After setting out this focus I will  spend most 
of Chapter 3 developing a new way of approaching virtue ethics that avoids the problems listed 
above as well as those that are more specific to virtue ethics. By promoting this revised virtue 
ethics approach I will not only create an account of the good life that is more inclusive but I will 
also strengthen such accounts in relation to average agents by developing a richer and more 





















CHAPTER 1:  DEFINING INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
 The process of defining disability is complicated and fraught with issues. Given that we 
never perceive disabilities as objects seperate from the persons who bear them it is hard to see 
what characteristics are unique to disability.  Furthermore, since different limitations are covered 
by the term disability it can be very difficult to see what all of these cases have in common.
19
 For 
instance, we would say that a person who is unable to walk, a person who can’t hear, and a 




One of the only starting places we have is to say that people who are disabled are 
different than ―normal‖ people.
21
 Yet, this is insufficient as there are also many other cases 
where people have skills that are different than normal and yet are not disabled. For example, 
professional athletes have skills that are not in the normal range yet we would not want to call 
them disabled. Even saying that the difference here is a deficit in functioning is not helpful as 
then we are hard pressed to account for cases where the given skills are present in very low 
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 Marian Croker. 2001. ―Sensing Disability‖. Hypatia 16 (4):34. 
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 Carlson also has a lot to say about the epistemic issues related to disability. Her focus is on our 
inability to understand the suffering that may or may not come with a disability but she also 
mentions that there are many other things able bodied persons have a hard time understanding in 
relation to the disabled. This is especially an issue in cases where people who are disabled are 
unable to speak as this often limits how much they can tell us about what their lives are like. See: 
Carlson 2009, 179. 
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not be discussing this option at length but see Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu. 2009. ―The 
Welfairist Account of Disability‖ in Disability and Disadvantage. Brownlee Ed. New York: 






capacities. Such cases are not really true deficits yet we want to call the person in such cases 
disabled nonetheless. For example, it is not the case that a dyslexic person can’t read. It is rather 
the case for most such persons that their reading level is very low or that this skill is very 
difficult for them to do.  
To further complicate matters there are also cases where disabilities lead people to 
develop skills that we would consider assets. The advent of Deaf Culture is a key example of this 
process. Here people who are deaf create a rich and vibrant culture with similarly skilled 
individuals. This culture is connected to their disability and could not have developed without it. 
Yet, despite this connection we would not want to say that deaf culture is negative in the way 
that saying it is part of a disability would seem to imply.  
We could brush these problems aside in favour of a pragmatic solution. After all, in 
general conversation we generally know what is meant by ―disability‖. Therefore, it would seem 
like we already have a working definition that is effective for general purposes. Yet, calling a 
person disabled alters how we treat them, what we expect of them, and what we think we owe to 
them.
22
 Therefore, despite the above difficulties we have a huge responsibility to use this term 
                                                             
22
 Although I have chosen a positive example here it is worth noting as James C. Harris does that 
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properly since it changes how we treat people both individually and as a society.
23
 Arriving at a 
correct account is therefore ethically important.  
In this chapter I will define disability while being responsive to the above concerns. As I 
engage with the debates about different aspects of disability I will present a picture of disability 
as an umbrella term best understood as referring to the concepts of ―impairment‖ and ―disability‖ 
as a more precise set of subterms. I will also show that disability is the product of both society 
and biology rather being created by just one of these sources. Both society and a person’s 
physical circumstances are involved in determining the level of disadvantage having an 
impairment will present for a person’s life. However, it is largely the reaction of society that 
determines how an impairment will be integrated into the self of the person who carries it.  
Having engaged with disability in this general sense I will define the specific types of 
mental impairments that will be the focus of this work. Although my original goal is to engage 
with the specific set of problems the impairments referred to as Intellectual Disabilities pose for 
virtue ethics this category must be drawn in much wider terms since there are many other 
impairments of the mind that do not fit this clinical diagnosis and yet pose the same major 
problems for virtue ethics. Although this set of impairments may not be a natural kind they make 
up a conceptual category due to the similarities in the problems they create for virtue ethics.  
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I) FORMALIZED DEFINITIONS FROM THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
 The World Health Organization (WHO) defines disability as follows:  
―Disabilities are an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations, and participation 
restrictions. An impairment is a problem in body function or structure; an activity limitation is a 
difficulty encountered by an individual in executing a task or action; while a participation 
restriction is a problem experienced by an individual in involvement in life situations.‖ 
24
 
This definition provides a more articulate version of our original associations. Noting that 
this is an ―umbrella term‖ tells us from the start that ―disability‖ can refer to many different 
aspects of this phenomena in the world. For example, in one case we may use this term to point 
to a person’s inability to see and in another it may point to the effects of this inability. Yet, this 
definition also begins to unpack the individual parts that compose this umbrella term. They first 
note that this concept refers in part to some sort of ―impairment‖ as a ―problem in bodily 
function or structure‖.
25
 As their further clarification suggests impairment is some problem with 
how the body works. Indeed, this term suggests that they are applying a comparison between 
how the person’s body functions in relation to other peoples’ bodies. Saying this person is 
impaired suggests that their body cannot do all of the things other bodies do. This privation of 
functioning is the root of both the impairment and the disability. 
Since this thesis engages with impairments of the mind one might wonder how the WHO 
definition of impairment can apply here given that it only explicitly mentions impairments of the 
body. Although the brain is part of the body the mind is often viewed in general discussion as 
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something separate given that it is understood as something more than just the physical brain and 
therefore is often its own area of focus. Yet, this idea of limited functioning can also be 
meaningfully applied to concerns of the mind. Indeed, WHO does include intellectual 
impairments as part of the conditions they classify as disabilities. In such cases the root of the 
disability is a limitation in functioning so that the mind is unable to do the things one would 
expect of the mind of a similar agent.  
The idea of impairment employed by WHO is a starting point for defining disability. 
However, since WHO merely say that impairment in the context of disability is some problem 
with bodily function this leaves open a question of scope. As it stands now this term is vague 
enough that one might wonder if a paper cut or a blister in an appropriately troublesome place 
would count as a disability. Yet, the inclusion of such an infirmity would weaken the definition 
to the point of absurdity. Given that, as mentioned above, saying someone is disabled changes 
what we expect of them and what we owe to them we want to be sure to avoid spurious cases.  
One way we could solve this problem is to also apply the ideas contained in the next parts 
of the WHO definition. The idea of an ―activity limitation‖ is described as ―[the] difficulty 
encounter by an individual [in relation to] a task or action‖. By this they mean to capture only the 
limitations caused by the person’s impairment. After all, a blind person can’t fly, but neither can 
anyone else. Therefore, since that limitation is not caused by the impairment it is safe to assume 
that such a limitation would be just part of being human and not part of the disability of visual 
impairment. 
This idea combined with the final component of ―participation restriction‖ is what 





be understood and applied separately in this case it is useful to employ them both to deal with the 
above issue of scope. A good example of what is meant by the final criterion is how a deaf 
person may not be able to learn from a university lecture if they do not read lips and it is not 
translated into sign language. By adding the stipulation that the impairment must affect the 
person’s participation in daily life we avoid the inclusion of minor cases like the one described 
above that should not really count as a true disability. For example, something like a blister or 
paper cut no matter how painful would not affect daily life in an extensive enough way to be a 
true disability.  It is only when something poses a true and lasting impediment to life 
participation that it becomes part of a disability.
26
 
Despite this criterion of non-trivial limitation cases where compensating strategies mask 
the impairment are still cases of impairment. For example, a dyslexic who corrects their spelling 
and letter reversal before the error goes on paper is still disabled.
27
 Although they have 
developed systems to help them function normally they are still limited in their activities because 
they have to go to the trouble of compensating for their impairment. This still affects their 
quality of life as they must use extra energy to compensate where an average person does not do 
so. 
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II) REFINING VOICES: MARTHA NUSSBAUM ON DISABILITY 
WHO’s definition of disability is very similar to the one provided by Martha Nussbaum 
in Frontiers of Justice. However, Nussbaum’s approach has many advantages as she is more 
efficient in her exposition of this definition. Given the level of clarification needed with the 
WHO definition Nussbaum presents a more elegant and efficient formulation of similar ideas. 
Therefore, after discussing Nussbaum’s formulation it will be the dominant definition for the rest 
of this work.  
Her definition has three elements: impairment, disability, and handicap.
28
 Her idea of 
impairment is largely the same as that of the WHO. However, her idea of disability combines 
WHO’s notions of participation limitations and activity limitations. Here she captures all of the 
things a person is unable to do as a result of their impairment. This combination is an asset to her 
definition as in the WHO formulation it often becomes difficult to differentiate between activity 
and participation limitations. For example, a person not being able to climb stairs first looks like 
an activity limitation. However, this limitation affects their participation in society to such a 
degree that it is also a participation limitation. In many such cases the small difference between 
the two limitations is not helpful enough to warrant discussing them separately. By combining 
these ideas we avoid false precision. 
On the other hand, Nussbaum is also overly precise when she includes ―Handicap‖
29
 in 
her definition. By adding this term Nussbaum means to point out a particular sort of limitation 
connected to impairments and our participation in society in a much wider and policy based 
sense than was meant by WHO’s participation limitations. Specifically, she means places where 
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impairment makes a person less able to compete with others for social resources. Given that she, 
like Rawls, is working in the contractarian tradition this kind of participation deserves special 
focus in her own work and definitions.  
However, as part of a general definition this emphasis is not necessary. Questions of 
resources will sometimes arise in other ethical contexts since ethics is often connected to the 
construction of social policy. However, here such issues can be handled with reference to 
Nussbaum’s idea of disability since loss of competitive access to social resources can just be 
considered another disability caused by the acting impairment. Adding an extra term only leads 
to unnecessary complexity and a proliferation of terms.  
In summary, Nussbaum provides the concepts of impairment and disability with which to 
unpack the umbrella term ―Disability‖. ―Impairment‖ allows us to pick out the factors that limit a 
person’s abilities and ―Disability‖ picks out the consequences these limitations have for daily 
life. Given the effectiveness and elegance of these two terms they are all the vocabulary we need 
to discuss disability generally and in relation to virtue ethics.  
III) WHAT CREATES DISABILITY? 
 Having defined these terms it is important to examine whether having an impairment in 
the above sense always leads to a disability as well. The oldest voice in this debate is the Medical 
Model. Here impairment and disability are seen as akin to an illness or a disease. Given that both 
the impairment and its ―symptoms‖ of disability were viewed like disease the biggest focus was 





measures could be taken to limit the severity of these symptoms some level of suffering and 
disability were just part of the ―disease‖ of impairment.
30
 
 While this model represents the best attempt of the medical community to deal with 
disability there are several important disanalogies between disability and disease that make the 
model problematic. In the first place, it fails to take into account the fact that while many 
diseases are curable impairments are typically much more permanent. In all of the cases that we 
call a disability today one of the primary criteria is that this is not something that can be cured in 
the way we can cure many infections and some diseases. Therefore, the focus on cure in this 
model makes it unsuitable for working with disability. 
31
 While this issue may just be a problem 
with our model of disease it is clear that this model is not effective for understanding disability. 
While modifications could be suggested to repair this model it is not worth repairing this 
framework when there are less problematic approaches available.  
 A possible replacement for the Medical Model is the Intrinsic Model. It views 
impairment as just another way of being. Just as average people are unable to run marathons or 
paint like Monet some people are unable to do basic tasks like reading, walking, and speaking. 
32
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In this ―individual traits‖ model impairments and disabilities are intrinsic traits of a given person 
rather than symptoms of a disease. Since there are things they will never be able to do as a result 
of what sort of person they are they have a disability as part of their identity.
33
 Furthermore, 
since the impairment is part of who this person is and the disability is part of the impairment no 
amount of social change will be able to alter the fact that this person has a disability.
 34
 
 A good comparison here would be to think of the difference between the average 
population and those with impairments as like the difference between Olympic athletes and 
average people.
35
 No matter how much we change society average peoples’ skills are not those 
of the elite athletes. Similarly, the difference between an average person and someone who is 
impaired is a difference in natural skill sets. Both the disability and the impairment in this 
account are just part of who a person is.  
 Although the Intrinsic Model presents a valuable alternative to the Medical Model, before 
accepting it as correct it is worth considering the merits of the Social Model. This approach takes 
the opposite way of understanding disability and defines it as something that is a part of how a 
society is set up and not as a part of a person’s identity. Here it is still the case that a person has a 
fact about them that is an impairment. However, here this fact does not have to lead to disability 
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if society is properly set up.
36
 As Licia Carlson puts it, ―disability‖ is a relational term between a 
person and society. The society is simply not set up to provide for people with impairments and 
thus creates situations where certain people are unable to do certain tasks and are seen as 
―disabled‖.
37
 Therefore, it is not an intrinsic fact of who the person is that they are disabled. It is 
rather a fact of society that makes it difficult for people of a certain sort to perform a task.
38
 
 For example, it is a biological fact that blind people cannot see. However, it is society 
that makes this impairment also a disability. The society assumes that every person can see. So, 
people who can’t see are unable to do things like use money or navigate around the world 
because the ways these tasks are set up assume sight. If society were set up differently this 
person would still be blind. However, this impairment would not mean that the person was 
disabled because they would be able to function like everyone else.  
 The biggest challenge the Intrinsic Model could pose to this view is that it takes liberties 
with the truth of what is taking place when society accommodates a person with a disability. 
Instead of acknowledging that this person is being accommodated to compensate for their 
limitations the above approach would like to say that the accommodation removes the limitations 
altogether.
39
 Indeed, the disability is supposed to be completely erased in this model with the 
right social set up. Yet, this obscures the truth as it ignores the fact that even with social change 
the impaired person is different than the average population in their needs and abilities. This 
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difference may not directly affect how they function in society but it is still part of their identity. 
To deny this part of their person is to deny a fact about the type of person they are.  
 For example, with a mobility impaired person the social model would like to say that if 
we set up the world around them so that they could use assistive devices to get from place to 
place with no difficulty they would no longer be disabled. Indeed, in some of the stronger 
formulations this person would no longer be considered impaired.
40
 Yet, this formulation ignores 
the fact that a great deal of compensating strategies and accommodation went in to allowing this 
person to move about unhindered. Although it would be hard to find an adaptation free baseline 
to compare this person too by saying that they are ―normal‖ or ―average‖ even in the best 
circumstances we ignore the fact that they still have needs that are different from the average 
population and so require accommodation in a much greater sense than the degree to which an 
average person adapts to life in a given society. 
  To avoid this unrealistic description of the situation we need to avoid making a false 
dichotomy by insisting that disability must be all the product of society or all the product of how 
people are. In place of either extreme view we should take up a blended solution where disability 
is part of how some people exist in the world but this effect of their impairments can be greatly 
moderated by setting up society in ways that allow them to accomplish many tasks. By seeing 
disability this way we can come up with an image of disability that takes into account the 
interaction between people and the world around them.   
 
 






IV) IMPAIRMENT, DISABILITY, AND DISADVANTAGE 
 Another perspective on disability is the Welfarist Account, which focuses on whether 
being a person with an impairment always leads to disadvantage.
41
 Although this is an open 
question in modern literature on disability it should be noted that the medical model
42
 and 
traditional approaches to disability assume that it is inherently negative. 
43
 Given that the 
traditional models group disability in with disease this negative polarization and the focus on 
prevention
44
 are understandable. However, given that other models of disability exist it is worth 
examining whether this connection between harm and disability is always warranted.  Since I 
have already given reasons for setting aside the medical model I will leave it aside here also for 
the purpose of brevity.  
This question is best laid out by Buchannan’s use of the terms ―conditional disadvantage 
of impairments‖ and ―unconditional disadvantage of impairments‖.
45
 A conditional disadvantage 
is created by a person with a given impairment who is also living in a particular sort of context. 
An example is a person who is mobility impaired being unable to work because there are no jobs 
in their society that do not involve the need to move about without assistance. This disadvantage 
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and all the socioeconomic consequences that come with it are the product of the context and the 
impairment and would not be present in other places.  
On the other hand, unconditional disadvantages are those that are part of the lives of an 
impaired person regardless of circumstance. A good example of this would be the fact that a 
mobility impaired person is going to need to have assistive devices or persons to help them move 
around the world and is going to need to have the resources to get these devices. Regardless of 
situation this disadvantage in the way this person needs to use resources will always be present. 
Indeed, so strong is the association between disability and harm in some formulations of this 
model that it is sometimes called the ―Personal Tragedy‖ model as it assumes that any case of 
impairment will always lead to something that is normatively bad for the person involved.
46
 
Although I have set out this debate with terms that almost presuppose the fact that 
disability is affected by the situation what matters in this debate is whether the disadvantages that 
come with a disability are mostly conditional upon social facts or mostly unconditional in the 
sense that it is part of the person regardless of social conditions. Both of these ideas about the 
nature of disadvantage and disability are live options in defining disability and both sides are 
supported by a variety of thinkers. There are those like Elizabeth Barns and Anita Silvers who 
hold that as long as society is set up correctly to suit their needs impaired people will not be at 
any more of a disadvantage than their unimpaired peers. Not surprisingly these people often side 
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with the social model of disability as described above. They see the solution to disadvantage and 
impairment as appropriate social accommodation. 
47
 
Alternately, as Barnes notes the other side of the debate holds that the harm that comes 
from impairment is mostly unconditional and as a result an impaired person will always be worse 
off than an unimpaired peer. Not surprisingly the people who hold this position often endorse the 
intrinsic models of disability as outlined above. 
48
 Given that they hold this view of impairment 
and disability they would also say that an impairment is always a predictor of lesser life chances 
for the person who bears it.  
A helpful distinction is the one noted by Barnes when she says that we need to 
distinguish between disadvantage from an impairment in the short term and disadvantage in the 
long term. In the short term every person who has an impairment will likely experience some 
degree of disadvantage. From the outset there will be things they are unable to do for themselves 
and this will lead to some emotional distress and frustration at the least but will also likely mean 
that they are disadvantaged in the sense that they will always have to access resources to 
compensate for this issue. 
However, in the long term it is much more dependent upon the society around the person 
as to whether their impairment causes them any lasting disadvantage. If his or her society is able 
to help them to compensate and lessen the things they are unable to do they will not be at more 
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of a disadvantage than their peers. However, if his or her society is unwilling or unable to help 
their disadvantage in the long term will be much greater.   
It could also be asked if the particular limitations a person has as a result of their 
impairment always mean that they will lack access to some good. For example, a person who is 
deaf will never be able to hear an opera regardless of their accommodations. Given that they will 
never be able to do this we might say that they are always lacking access to certain goods and 
will always be disadvantaged. Yet, to take this approach ignores the fact that all of us, by our 
circumstances, lack access to certain goods.  
I, for example, will never be able to see the light house at Alexandria or many of the 
other wonders of the ancient world. I am a modern person who is born at a time when seeing 
those things is just not open to me as all but the pyramid at Giza have been destroyed. It would 
certainly be good for my development as a person to see those things. Indeed, in comparison to a 
person who was born at a time when these things existed I am certainly made worse off by the 
time of my birth in the specific sense of not being able to have this experience. Yet, those who 
were alive at the time of the light house at Alexandria will never see a space shuttle take off or 
get to enjoy images of the earth from space. By virtue of our time of birth both of us are 
disadvantaged in the sense of not being able to have a particular sort of experience. However, it 
is difficult to say if we are really all that disadvantaged since in both cases we have enormous 
advantages which the other does not possess. 
This is a very similar situation to the case of a person who is impaired. While they may 
not have access to the goods open to the fully able the able also lack access to the goods of the 





deaf culture the way they can. A mobility impaired person may not be able to climb the CN 
Tower but I also will never be able to play wheel chair basketball in the natural way they can. 
We can both experience the good of the other to a certain degree but our access to goods is 
different enough that we can’t really compare these goods to each other. Therefore, this is more a 
case of having access to different goods rather than one group being disadvantaged by not having 
access to the goods enjoyed by the other.
49
 
V) RELATION OF THE IMPAIRMENT TO THE SELF 
Another common question about the nature of disability is whether disability affects the 
person’s self.
50
  As noted above the intrinsic model holds that an impairment is just part of the 
person. However, we might expect that the rest of their person will develop more or less 
normally despite the presence of the impairment. 
51
 For example, a person who is visually 
impaired does not use sight to interact with the world. However, under all of that they are just a 
regular person who exists inside an impaired body that does not allow them to see. 
 Other voices in this discussion say that this separation between the person and their 
impairment is too artificial. Since what we can do and how we are able to interact with the world 
affects the kind of person we become impairment cannot exist without affecting the formation of 
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 This side of the debate rejects the idea that the self is just the ―ghost in the 
machine‖ and says that who we are is always linked to how we interact with the world.  
 Although there are reasons for the above model to hold that impairments can be separate 
from the self holding this position on the self denies the role environment plays in shaping the 
self. Things like how we are socialized play a huge role in shaping our selves. As Wong and 
McGee both suggest as impaired persons move through the world their whole self, impairment 
and all, will be part of how they interact with the world and how the world reflects their self back 
to them.
53
 As was implied by previous examples they are different than regular people in some 
very relevant ways. So, they develop different self-concepts to match as a result of their 
socialization. 
54
 To say otherwise is to deny the power of socialization to shape the self.  
As Shelly Tremian notes, impairment’s effect on the self might be similar to the ways 
gender affects the self.
55
 Strictly speaking, a person’s gender as male, female, or intersexed could 
be seen as having no effect on their self. After all, other than for the processes of procreation and 
waste elimination there is very little difference in how people of different genders are in the 
world. In fact, it could seem like gender is just something that is tacked on to the core person 
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 Yet, gender and its external markers change how the world around us interacts 
with us and the image of our self that is reflected to us just as having an impairment does. 
Therefore, gender shapes our self in a way that is very similar to the relationship between 
impairment and the formation of the self.  
VI) SUMMARY OF MY DEFINITION 
 In summary, a disability is any significant limitation on a person’s ability to perform 
general life tasks. This limitation is caused by an impairment on their intellectual or physical 
functioning. Furthermore, for a condition to be considered an impairment and/or disability the 
limitations it places on a person’s ability to function must be non-trivial and have an effect on 
their quality of life. In my blended understanding disabilities are part of what it means to have an 
impairment as such a limitation will always cause some sort of corresponding limitation on what 
a person is able to do. However, with appropriate social accommodation this limitation can be 
lessened. Contrary to what is held by either the Social or Intrinsic Model disability is not the sole 
result of either biology or society.   
 Impairments will generally disadvantage their bearer in the short term as the disabled 
must compensate for things they are unable to do. However, in the long term disadvantage is not 
a forgone conclusion. With appropriate support from society it is possible that they will be able 
to compensate for their impairment so that they are not disadvantaged. Here again, as was the 
case with the debate about what creates disability a blended approach is the best option. Impaired 
people also may not have access to particular good things as a result of their impairment. 
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However, this is no different than the rest of the population who also may not have access to a 
given good thing given their situation and location. This is a case of different goods rather than a 
privation of goods.  
 Finally, just as things like gender, race, body and body size affect how others view us and 
how we interact with the world so too our abilities and limitations also affect this relationship. 
Although this effect on the self is not necessarily negative it does not appear that disability is 
case of an otherwise normal person trapped inside an impaired mind or body. Although the 
person is not their impairment the type of person they are is shaped by their impairment and how 
it shapes their interaction with the world.  
vii) Defining Rational Disability  
 Having provided a general definition of disability I am now going to turn to applying this 
set of ideas to intellectual and rational disabilities which are the focus of this work. Although all 
of what I have said about disability generally applies to this type of disability I would like to 
spend some time defining my terms so as to make my focus clear. To begin with, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV states that mental retardation or intellectual 
disability are characterized by an IQ of less than 70 points.
57
 It is further marked by an inability 
to form adaptive behaviours and life skills. This low IQ and the way it shapes a person’s life 
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marks out what the DSM-IV and the medical profession have to say about intellectual disability. 
58
 
 This definition is a good place to start as it marks out the type of limitation that is 
generally picked out by the term ―intellectual disability‖. However, this definition needs to be 
altered as while it may be useful for diagnosis it is far too narrow for correct understanding of the 
whole concept.  As Carlson notes it is understandable that a definition which governs medical 
treatment only picks out a small set of very homogenous concepts since it is these fine details 
that help to identify the issues and determine treatment.
59
 Yet, like the medical model I discuss 
above this approach to disability is not helpful in terms of ethics as it does not deal with the issue 
in broad conceptual terms.  
 The other problem with medical definitions is their static nature. Indeed, Brosco, Harris, 
Carson, and Shoemaker have all noted that definitions that rely on a specific set of criteria do not 
take into account the fact that people with intellectual disabilities are able to grow and change.
60
 
By using this model to decide what disease they have and then proceeding with treatment we 
gain an inaccurate and unhelpful picture of disability and the people who bear it.  
Indeed, despite the narrow and static focus of the medical model there are several 
impairments which, although clinically different from Intellectual Disability, present similar 
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problems in terms of ethics and the good life. Things like depression and other mental illnesses 
affect a person’s mind in ways that present many of the same problems for ethics as are created 
by intellectual disability. By using broader concepts and wider terms we can work efficiently 
these similar problems for ethics.  
 To deal with this problem of inclusiveness we can focus instead on rational disabilities 
broadly understood as a group of impairments that hinder a person’s rational abilities to do 
things like thinking abstractly, understanding cause and effect and applying general concepts to a 
specific case. In all such cases the impairment that is causing the problem may be very different 
and warrant very different medical treatment. Autism and Clinical Depression, for example, are 
very different in terms of what medical and social needs there bearers have. However, because 
they both affect a person’s ability to reason they both present a problem for the major schools of 
ethics given that reason is so staunchly emphasised. Therefore, for these purposes examining 
impairments with similar effects as a unit will allow us to engage with the relevant problems 
most efficiently. Although this category allows for clear analysis of concepts it is not natural 
kind. They are similar their effects on the person’s abilities but there is little else that makes them 
similar to each other.  
However, it should be noted that understanding disability in this way continues to support 
the idea proposed above that both society and biology have a part in creating disability. Although 
the idea of disability picks out a biological fact it is the ideas of society that form conceptual 





although I recognize that rational disabilities are not a natural kind it is acceptable to engage with 
them as a group as the similar problems they pose to ethics are worth analyzing as a unity. 
61
 
The type of action that would be impaired by these ―Rational Disabilities‖ is the ability to 
think with a level of clarity and abstraction so that one can draw good deductive conclusions and 
perform well thought out actions involving both cognitive and meta-cognitive skills. By thinking 
things through carefully and by reflecting on our thinking we are generally more able to make 
decisions that are reasonable and effective. This element of critical thinking and self-awareness 
is a key part of being a rational agent as it allows us to spot our mistakes and become better 
reasoners in the future.  
 As alluded to above, given that this type of complex reasoning takes a fair amount of 
thought and abstraction on the part of the agent there could be many impairments which could 
inhibit a person’s ability to perform this action. In the first place anything that made a person 
unable to reason soundly based on a set of information would inhibit this process. In this case 
things like a lower IQ, slow processing speed and the inability to develop consequential 
reasoning could inhibit rationality.  
Impairments that limit our ability to gather accurate information about the world would 
also inhibit our ability to reason soundly as even with the best deductive skills if we start from 
false premises we will not get sound conclusions. In this case some developmental delays or 
cases of a low IQ that means the person is unable to understand the world around them would 
also inhibit this part of the process. Mental disorders like schizophrenia that lead to paranoia or 
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delusion or cases where emotional responses significantly affect our view on the world might 
also change how accurately our perceptions are formed. Additionally, cases where the memory is 
impaired might also affect this stage of the process as the person may be unable to remember 
past consequences or compile past information with the present situation to see the whole 
picture.  
Finally, anything that makes us unable to monitor our own application of this process 
could be considered a relevant impairment. Although average people have problems exercising 
this self-monitoring there are impairments that make this task even more difficult than usual. For 
example, a low IQ or developmental delays might lead to a distorted view of the self or an 
inability to think critically. However, other mental illnesses or personality disorders might also 
inhibit this part of the process so that a person is unable to reason fully as they would be unable 
to monitor their own thought processes. In total, in all of these cases the impairment in question 
makes us unable to perform some part of the reasoning process. By inhibiting this process these 
disorders impair the agent’s reason and lead to a rational disability.  
 It should be noted that in some cases all of us have impaired reason. If we have had too 
much to drink or are over tired we may not reason the way we should. Also, if we are not 
provided with the right facts about the world our reason may be temporarily impaired. While it is 
important to remember this fact when we are trying to help disabled people, temporary rational 
impairments are not part of my focus as permanent rational impairments affects a person’s ability 
to reason and make choices over the long term and thus affect the extent to which they are able 
to shape their character effectively and rationally. While temporary impairment may be a 
problem for a few days, it is the permanent variety which deserves our attention because it can 





of interests in some ethical contexts it is this issue of impairment in the long term that is most 
important given the emphasis on character in virtue ethics.  
 Here again it should be noted that none of us are ever perfect reasoners even if we do not 
have any impairments. After all, we are all prone to letting emotion or the factors of the moment 
affect our judgment. We are also not always in possession of all of the information we need to 
make a sound and reasoned decision. However, what matters here is that the ability of people 
with certain types of impairments to reason is always as a much lower baseline than the average 
person. So, while we all have issues with reason from time to time rational disabilities are more 
of a problem in this respect as from the beginning these people have a lesser ability to reason 
regardless of situational factors and thus present a particular challenge to ideas of the good life 
where reason is given particular emphasis.  
VIII) SUMMARY 
 In this chapter I have developed a definition of disability and its closely related concept 
of impairment. By engaging with the work of the World Health Organization and Martha 
Nussbaum I have developed a working definition of disability generally that will be employed 
for the rest of this work. To extend the scope of this definition I have also shown that disabilities 
should be understood as being created by both the society around a person with its expectations 
regarding ability and by the impairments and limitations in functioning that person experiences. I 
have also examined the relationship between impairment, disability and disadvantage and the 
connection between disability and their self of the bearer.  
 Following this general definition I have also explored the definitions relating to my 
specific focus on disabilities that are not purely physical. Although the ideas discussed about 





of disability presents some specific challenges which are less common with purely physical 
limitations. By talking about how these two cases are different and how they are similar I hope to 
have further illuminated the non-physical disabilities which will be the focus of the rest of this 
work. 
 Finally, I have also marked out the range of intellectual disabilities that I wish to focus 
on. By noting that I wish to focus on any disability created by something that limits a person’s 
reason I want to mark out that as well as including what is covered by the traditional term 
―intellectual disability‖, I also want to include some types of mental illness and sensory 
impairments as I think that the ethical concerns with these impairments are similar. By 
constructing my own terms I hope to avoid any confusion or concerns about what is included in a 
given category so that I can make my purpose as clear as possible.  
 In the chapter that follows I will be giving an outline of virtue ethics and how it causes 
some very specific problems for rational impairments and the people who bear them. I will also 
be engaging further with some of the debates about what the good life should look like for all of 
us but particularly for those with impaired reason. With the above set of definitions in place I can 
now start to outline the problem these constructs create for virtue ethics. Before the end of this 
work I also hope to offer some solutions for how the above constructs can be unified with the 









CHAPTER 2:  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 
 Virtue ethics is an account with exacting standards for a good human life. What makes 
these standards most exacting is their focus on human rational abilities and higher intellectual 
functions. Although these standards ask a lot of average people they pose an even greater 
problem for persons with impaired rational abilities. Indeed, these standards are so exacting that 
unless they undergo some degree of reformulation they exclude people with impaired rational 
abilities from moral and happy life altogether. Given that this a substantive claim about the moral 
status of impaired agents this exclusion represents a problem for virtue ethics and perhaps even a 
reason against its adoption. In what follows I will detail the parts of virtue ethics that cause this 
problem and show that a reformulation of virtue ethics is the only way to salvage it in the face of 
this exclusivity.  
I) CHARACTER: A UNIQUE FOCUS 
 Virtue ethics examines the moral value of an agent in a way that is not common to other 
stories about the good life. Alternative approaches such as consequentialism and deontology 
think of good agents in terms of the actions they perform and the motives and values involved 
therein. In the eyes of such accounts a good agent is a person who has performed the right 
actions in a way that leads to a good life. Such theories begin with an account of right action, 
rather than an account of virtuous character..  
 In contrast to this external focus virtue ethics looks to the status of the agent’s character 
to determine their moral value. A good agent is not just someone who has performed the 
prescribed action but rather is an agent who is the right sort of person. John McDowell calls this 
an analysis of actions ―from the inside out‖ where agents are expected to have the right sort of 







 Furthermore, as will be detailed below this good and happy life must live up to 
particular objective standards to be considered truly good.  
II) VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE GOOD LIFE 
 This good and happy life is developed based on an understanding of what kind of 
creature a human being is and what traits generally allow this type of being to be successful and 
flourishing.
63
 Characteristic dispositions that contribute positively to the good life are the virtues. 
Those that actively detract from this purpose are considered to be vices. It is through virtuous 
internal dispositions rather than individual actions that an agent is able to attain virtue and the 
happy life it promotes. The goal is to be a person who is disposed to always act in ways that 
contribute to a good and successful life by the standards of virtue ethics.  
 An example of how human identity connects to the virtues can be seen in the 
development of the virtue of patience. Since human beings are the type of being that can work on 
detailed and highly involved projects patience is often necessary so that a person can work 
toward a large and complex goal over a long period of time. Since these complex actions make a 
person better off and allow them to attain goods and develop themselves having this virtuous 
disposition contributes to a happy life as it allows us to reach goods and levels of personal 
development that would not be possible without patience.  
 By saying this happy life comes from the type of being a human being is, virtue ethics 
does not mean to say that this should be the standard for a good human life because all humans 
are naturally virtuous. Even limited observation of human beings will show us that this is not the 
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case. What is meant here is rather that the virtues of, for example, patience, courage, justice, and 
mercy are what allow humans to flourish and have successful lives. It is this much more 
idealized standard that connects virtue with what a human being ought to be.  
 It should be noted that calling this life ―happy‖ does not point to some idea of pleasure or 
joy. Indeed, there are ways in which practicing virtues like temperance while at the bar or 
prudence in one’s romantic relationships will inhibit pleasure. However, the happy life virtue 
ethics intends to promote is more a life of eudemonia. By this most translations mean that a 
happy person has attained a level of virtue and excellence or flourishing so that they are living up 
to all of the things that are best for a human being. It is this type of successful flourishing that is 
the goal of a happy human life.  
III) THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF HUMAN BEINGS AND THE STANDARDS OF VIRTUE ETHICS 
 The vocabulary used to describe this happy life and the aspects of a human being that 
facilitate it vary greatly in ancient and modern accounts. While modern formulations use the idea 
of a species norm as described by Philippa Foot in ―Natural Goodness‖, Aristotle is using very 
similar criterion but simply says that the virtues are what the best human beings have rather than 
being some norm of the human species.
64
 Yet, despite this difference,  modern thinkers like 
Anscombe, Foot, Hursthouse, and Macintyre all pick up on a similar set of features as Aristotle 
does. In what follows here I will give a brief description of each of these features so as to provide 
a general picture of virtue ethics. Yet, although each of these features is a main component of 
virtue ethics it should also be noted that these are the very features that exclude impaired agents 
in the ways mentioned above.  
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I) HUMANS BEINGS AS RATIONAL ANIMALS 
 The first key feature of all of these accounts is that human beings are Aristotle’s ―rational 
animal‖, endowed with the ability to use reflection and practical reasoning to examine their 
actions and surroundings.
65
 This feature is also emphasised by contemporary proponents of 
virtue ethics who focus on practical reasoning and its role in the habits that create a happy human 
life. However, in either formulation a key part of being a member of the human species is this 
ability to reason about the world around you in complex ways that are not open to other lower 
animals. In most modern accounts this key feature is called practical reasoning.
66
  
 This might make it seem as if virtue requires constant conscious deliberation where the 
agent is continually and actively thinking about what the best action would be. However, it 
should be noted that although Driver and Merritt have taken this part of virtue ethics to be this 
process of continual deliberation the original formulations do not involve this level of 
intentionality.
67
 In contemporary accounts by Anscombe and Foot, as well as in the classical 
formulations by Aristotle the idea of habituation is already present.  Indeed, Aristotle says that 
part of the happy life is learning to do things excellently with ease and pleasure.
68
 This idea 
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denotes the fact that although cultivating virtue involves complex cognitive resources it is not the 
case that the person who has to think the hardest about what is most virtuous is on the right track. 
Rather, fully virtuous people will be so habituated to virtue that their character will steer them in 
the most virtuous direction automatically. Therefore, while Driver and Merritt go to great lengths 
to promote their idea of non-deliberative virtue this idea is a clarification already found in the 
original account rather than a true modification.   
 What this part of virtue ethics denotes is the fact that human beings are best able to 
develop themselves and live good lives when they engage their rational abilities. By developing 
their character so as to be habitually properly disposed to virtue an agent uses their rational mind 
to become the type of agent that it is best for them to be. Since it is the rational mind that drives 
the virtues its use is a key part of a happy human life.  
II) HUMANS AS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ANIMALS 
 The second key feature highlighted by virtue ethics is our inclination to be social and live 
in community.
69
 For Aristotle this standard of human living comes from the view that humans 
are political animals who are meant to be involved in public life in ways not open to other 
animals.
70
 For example, although other animals live in groups humans are some of the only 
animals who actually spend time and energy deliberately forming these groups. By using our 
reason to develop these complex relationships human beings perform an action which sets them 
apart from other types of animals.  
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 This social ability connects to a happy human life first because it is undeniably easier to 
live a happy life if we have others to help us attain the goods needed to promote this life. 
Through division of labour and co-operation we are able to do more with the resources we have 
and develop ourselves further. However, Aristotle
71
 and others are quick to point out that a 
virtuous life is nothing without friends. By having friends to share the virtuous life we are made 
happier than if we were to have all of the virtues but lacked this vital social relationships. Given 
that this type of relationship is seldom possible outside society humans are happiest and most 
successful when their lives include this social component.  
III) HUMANS AS LANGUAGE USERS 
 The final key feature of contemporary Virtue ethics is less explicit in Aristotle’s account 
but is nonetheless part of his idea of humans as political animals. In addition to being social 
animals Foot and her contemporises also note that human beings use language in a way not open 
to other animals.
72
 Indeed, although other animals use sounds and gestures to communicate with 
each other human beings are the only species that has a complex enough system of language to 
be able to communicate a wide range of ideas about our surroundings, internal states, and even 
abstract things. Since such communicative abilities are so much a part of human life they too are 
part of the standards for a good human life employed by virtue ethics.  
 At first glance it is difficult to see how language ability connects to having a happy life. 
After all, it does not seem obvious that we need to be able to communicate to be happy in such a 
complex way. Yet, given that so many of the highest goods in human life involve complex ideas 
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and social interactions, language is every bit as much of a part of this happy life as friendship or 
rational ability. Language allows humans to participate in intellectual and social goods that make 
up a large part of the fully developed life of the mind. Therefore, language is necessary to 
promote flourishing.   
IV) CHARACTER AND THE INTELLECT73 
 In the case of each of these standards the key component is the way the human mind 
allows us to perform complex tasks and form social relationships which allow for the 
development of the person. In the case of our reason, social relationships, and language skills it 
is the way the mind uses practical wisdom to perform these acts that sets us apart. Other animals 
are different from human beings because they cannot use their minds in this way. By planning 
out actions and choosing what sort of person we want to be virtue ethics emphasizes the 
importance of dispositions to employ practical reason in a way that allows us to be successful 
and live up to the best way of life for us as a member of the human species. Someone who is 
habitually merciful, courageous, and patient for example, has the character traits needed to 
participate in this happy life.  
 Our capacity to use practical reason is what makes us moral agents and so is connected to 
the sense that it is appropriate to hold us responsible for our actions. Since moral agents have the 
rational ability to plan how they act and to reflect on what sort of a person would take a given 
action we can safely say that an action they undertake is really of their own volition and making. 
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Since they are able to think about their actions before acting in most regular cases the idea that 
they should not be held responsible for their action is ruled out. Therefore, the idea that a person 
has this rational control over the type of agent they want to be means that we can make 
judgments about their moral status as an agent.  
 Given that the mind and our ability to use it in such complex ways has such a large role 
in the formation of the good life, virtue ethics presupposes that there be a minimum level of 
intelligence a person must have in order to develop excellence of character. To put it as 
Hursthouse does ―to possess a virtue is to be a person with a certain complex mind set.‖
74
 
Although different formulations of virtue ethics say this differently this also means that, as 
Macintyre so aptly puts it, ―a certain level of stupidity precludes virtue‖
75
. In other words, there 
is a minimum level of intellectual ability
76
 that is needed if a person ever hopes to live up to this 
standards of virtue connected to the good life. If a person is unable to use their practical reason 
or is unable to communicate and form social relationships they will have limited ability to 
develop character to the standards of a good human life listed above.  
 What this fact highlights about the standards of virtue ethics is that they privilege the 
abilities of the human mind above all. Given that the human mind has rational abilities that are 
not present in the minds of other animals this norm seems reasonable since it highlights a key 
feature of what it is to be a member of the human species. However, there are many human 
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beings who do not have this high degree of intellectual capacity. For example, small children and 
the very old may not possess this level of reason given their place in the human life cycle.  
 Furthermore, given that virtue ethics places so much moral worth on rationality
77
 and 
makes so many reason-based expectations of people this focus on reason gives virtue ethics a 
narrow focus from the start.  Given that in the case of people with rational impairments this level 
of reason may not be possible these people will also be excluded from the moral life prescribed 
by virtue ethics in a much more permanent way than was the case for people who lack reason at 
a given time in their life cycle. Since they will never have more rational ability then they already 
do there is no chance for them to grow into moral life or have been involved in it in the past. Yet, 
since people with rational impairments are still recognized as people there exclusion from moral 
life means that virtue ethics includes a serious flaw in scope unless it can find a place for these 
agents or justify why they should be excluded from moral life.  
V) THE UNITY OF THE VIRTUES 
In addition to this problem of scope created by the standards of virtue ethics the idea that 
the virtues are a unity included in many accounts of virtue ethics also causes problems for the 
inclusion of agents with limited rational capacity. In this thinking the virtues are so strongly 
interconnected that a person cannot have any one of the virtues if they do not have them all. 
78
 
For example, being courageous may sometime require one to be patient, and being properly 
merciful may also require one to be just—it would display a lack of the virtue of mercy to grant 
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clemency to someone who did not deserve it. Therefore to have courage or patience one must 
also have other supporting virtues mercy and justice. Although other formulations of this idea 
exist in other accounts it is this above idea of interconnection which is most common and 
therefore presents the biggest threat to the inclusion of people with impaired reason in moral life. 
79
  
Simply put, in the case of people with impaired reason there will often be one or more of 
the virtues which they do not have the intellectual resources to exercise. Given that the unity 
thesis says that one must have all the virtues to have any one of them this means that people with 
impairments which limit their cultivation of one of the virtues will be unable to have any of the 
virtues at all. Therefore, they will be excluded from moral life so that they do not even have a 
chance of being able to cultivate virtue in any sense. This is major exclusion and without the 




VI: RATIONAL DISABILITY AND VIRTUE ETHICS: A PROBLEMATIC PAIRING 
Having given a general outline of virtue ethics I will now outline the problem I wish to 
focus on. Simply put, although virtue ethics has many benefits it presents a very particular set of 
problems in relation to agents who have impairments that limit their mind or intellect in any 
significant way. Although some of these problems have been mentioned above in connection to 
the unity of the virtues there are other problems of this sort that deserve examination.  
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VII) A PROBLEMATIC SET OF STANDARDS: AN ISSUE OF STARTING POINTS 
 By far the biggest problem with respect to rationally impaired agents and virtue ethics is 
with the standards that underpin virtue ethics’ approach to the good life. From the start virtue 
ethics expects that agents will be able to live up to a set of standards as a member of their 
species. Beyond merely setting out what is normal for a given species virtue ethics takes this one 
step further and says that there is also a species-based set of things that an agent ought to be in 
order to be flourishing and fully developed. Yet, given that with in the human species there are 
many different degrees of capability and impairment there will always be people who are unable 
to reach this standard.  
 The cases of exclusion I am most interested in are people who lack the intellectual 
capacity to employ practical wisdom, use language, or participate in social life,  and so seem to 
be excluded from the flourishing expected of people in virtue ethics. Given their impairments 
they are just not able to exercise these capacities at a basic level, let alone to the degree required 
by the good life of virtue ethics. Throughout the rest of this chapter I will illustrate the spectrum 
of agents I mean to include in this worry so as to further illustrate why it is difficult to include 
these people in the good life of traditional virtue ethics.  
 On the lowest level of impairment we have people who have episodes of impairment. For 
example, people with disorders like depression can intermittently use their practical wisdom to 
have dispositions and character in the way virtue recommends. When they are caught up in a 
particularly serious low their ability to reason will be impaired. However, since such extreme 
lows will not be their entire life they will at least some of the time be able to live up to a species 
norm of practical wisdom and be able to form character traits like patience, humility, mercy and 





adherence to the standards of virtue ethics will be difficult for them and will mean that they will 
sometimes be excluded from the moral life virtue ethics prescribes.  
The next degree of impairment to cause exclusion is cases of consistent but mild 
impairment affecting a person’s reason. Developmental or intellectual disability could be at the 
heart of this impairment. For example, in the case of a person who has a serious working 
memory deficit they may be able to reason about what kind of agent they want to be and what 
kind of dispositions they must have. However, even having decided what kind of life they are 
going to lead with the passage of time they may not be able to fully remember what actions they 
must take and so would not be able to act in a consistent enough way to form lasting 
dispositions.  
In such cases people will be able to do some of the reasoning required by the species 
norm. They will also likely be able to use language at least to a degree and also to form at least 
some level of social relationship. However, since the real goal here is not just the right kind of 
reasoning but also the right kind of disposition formation these people would also fall short of 
virtue based standards because the faculties surrounding their practical reasoning are not strong 
enough to make even the best reasoned process into action. Their social relationships will also 
likely be of such a basic nature that they too will not fully live up to this species norm. 
Therefore, they will also be unable to fully live up to the standards of virtue ethics to a high 
enough degree to be fully happy.  
In the most extreme cases of this problem we have people who lack the cognitive 
resources to use their mind or body in self-directed ways. This status would apply to people very 





these cases the impairment is so severe that it would affect not just their ability to use practical 
reasoning but also the person’s language skills and social relationships. Since these impairments 
are so global such persons are completely unable to develop any of the skills set out by virtue-
based standards. While they may have other skills open to them, language, complex social 
relationships and practical reasoning are completely out of their reach and by extension so is 
virtue.  
 The fact that living up to the standards of virtue ethics is not open to all persons would 
not be such a problem if these standards were just a tool to differentiate humans from other 
similar animals. If these were just standards of selection then we would just need to understand 
that there is the possibility of outlying cases. However, since attaining these standards is essential 
to a good human life they are very problematic for people with rational impairments as being 
excluded from this norm also means that they are excluded from the moral life we expect of 
human beings.  
This consequence of virtue ethics seems very harsh indeed. After all, in most other 
contexts we do not want to exclude a person from moral life as a result of disadvantages beyond 
their control. Although excluding these people from our norms of a good life is not really 
blaming them for their own condition we are being extremely exclusive about whose life we call 
good and whose we do not. While it may be the case that we later decide that the effect of these 
impairments really is so severe as to preclude participation in moral life this is not an exclusion 
to make without justification to a degree not found in virtue ethics. If we are to exclude rationally 
impaired agents from this norms and access to happiness we must at least consider and justify 





 In what follows I will give some more details about how each part of this species norm is 
out of reach for many people with rational impairments. By giving these details I hope to further 
elucidate why people with rational impairments pose such a problem for virtue ethics. As I have 
noted in my introduction this problem is not unique to virtue ethics and is also a live issue for 
other moral theories. In the case of both Virtue Ethics and Rawlsian contractualism the idealized 
people used as a starting point for the theory are not varied enough to be inclusive.  As such, the 
original positions of both theories are just too narrow to take the disabled into account.  
 However, it should be noted that this issue of starting point is a much greater threat to 
virtue ethics than it is to contractualism. When contractualism makes claims about who is and is 
not included in ethics these claims are made in the pursuit of developing an admittedly idealized 
and  formalized model of social organization, rather than as an attempt to describe the essence of 
human beings. However, in virtue ethics the starting point is intended to say something about 
what a human being ought to be on a much deeper level. Therefore, by excluding people with 
rational impairments from its starting point virtue ethics commits its self to conclusions with 
much deeper implications then those of contractualism.  
VIII) A NARROW SORT OF WISDOM 
 Having discussed this issue of starting points I will look at how each of the specific 
standards in virtue ethics is a problem for agents with rational impairments. The first major 
problem for the norm used by virtue ethics is the fact that the wisdom that is stressed by virtue 
ethics is very exacting. In all cases it is practical wisdom that involves responsiveness to the right 
reasons, acting with the right intentions, and having the right emotions that matters. All of this 
internal framework must be present along with a characteristic disposition of knowing what is 





seems to be right in the situation. One must also have done this act in the right way. This is 
asking a lot of every agent as it is not enough for them to be trained to do the right action or 
follow the rules. Unless they are doing the action for the right reason, and unless they do so 
characteristically, and not merely on some occasions, they cannot be fully virtuous.  
 To be clear here, by saying that all of these factors must be present for a person to be 
fully virtuous we are not saying that by not having some or all of these things the agent is bad or 
vicious. On the contrary, there is a wide range of actions that are neither virtue nor vice. So, 
failing to act in ways that are one type of act does not lead, by default, to the other. However, in 
the case of a person who cannot live up to the wisdom required by virtue it is the case that they 
cannot be fully virtuous. And, because of the close connection virtue ethics draws between virtue 
and happiness, this mean that they cannot have a fully good or happy life. Given that this good 
life is a key part of virtue this is still a problem for the agent because if they cannot attain these 
character traits and dispositions then virtue and happiness are automatically out of reach as well.  
 This idea of the internal states that go with a right action in virtue ethics is problematic 
for people with intellectual impairments as they are often not capable of having the right inner 
states that go with this action. For example, if I was a person with autism my emotional 
responses to the world would be different than those of other people. After all, a key part of this 
impairment is that a person fails to develop the emotional responses and affective qualities we 
usually expect of people.
81
 Given this lack of the proper emotions this person would also be 
automatically unable to have one of the key mental states that must accompany virtue. Given this 
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requirement then a person who has little emotional response at all would be unable to live up to 
this standard.  
 In other cases it might be the responsiveness to reason that it the problem. For example, a 
person with schizophrenia will not be able to respond to the same reasons as the average person 
because they do not have the connection to reality that would allow them to even perceive these 
reasons. Likewise, the thinking of a person with Downs Syndrome may not be complex enough 
to fully comprehend the reasons for acting a given way. In all of the above cases the nature of 
these impairments means that these people are just unable to live up to the narrow sort of 
wisdom that is required by virtue ethics. In some cases they could be coached so that it might be 
possible to do the right action. However, given the missing mental and emotional component this 
would not be considered acting with virtue since the right actions are not enough.  
IX) A PARTICULAR SORT OF SOCIAL LIFE 
 In addition to the above issues with the narrow scope of practical wisdom the second 
issue that virtue ethics presents for people with rational impairments it the type of social life and 
social participation it demands of virtuous people. As Macintyre notes especially in classical 
accounts one cannot be a virtuous person without being a good and participating citizen. Since 




 Foot and other contemporary virtue theorists also note that the requirement of a social life 
means that one must also have a certain ability to use language. So, in such accounts not only 
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must one have a social life to be a flourishing person but as is entailed by this requirement one 
must also have a certain level of language ability so that one can communicate with people in 
social settings. 
 Both the requirement of a social life and this degree of language competence are 
problematic for many people with rational impairments. Although people at the upper end of the 
spectrum of functioning may have no problem with conversing with others and being in society 
this world of ―savants‖
83
 and people whose impairments are mild is not representative of many 
people with intellectual impairments. For example, although language use is quite possible for 
many people with Downs Syndrome there are many cases where the complex social relationships 
and friendship of equals are not possible for them given the deficit in their IQ. Even as people at 
roughly the middle of the spectrum full participation in the social life that virtue ethics sees as 
essential to the good life is just not open to them given its complexity.  
 However, in even more stark contrast to people who can use language and have some 
degree of social relationship, we also have people whose intellectual abilities are so impaired that 
they are unable to use language at all.
84
 A person in a persistent vegetative state or someone who 
never developed past the stage of infancy will be incapable of language and also largely 
incapable of the complex social relationships emphasized by virtue ethics.  At this point on the 
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spectrum it is particularly apparent that these people are excluded from the language and social 
life expected of them by virtue ethics.  
This is a problem for inclusive ethics as here we also need to say that such persons are 
unable to be fully virtuous, and so unable to live good lives, if they are unable to live up to a full 
human social life. In some cases they may be able to get part of the way there but even this is not 
enough to allow for virtue. From the very beginning the basic abilities of these people are just 
not enough to allow them to seek the good life in virtue. Although some advocates of virtue 
ethics might be fine with saying that some people are just not in the scope of virtue given that we 
usually try not to exclude impaired people from things without good cause it is strange that virtue 
ethics has little place for them in the good life and makes no move to justify this exclusion. 
Without further justification holding a version of virtue ethics that entails this consequence this 
conclusion is very heavy-handed indeed in light of the goal of this thesis in providing a more 
inclusive approach to virtue ethics.  
It might be the case that part of having intellectual impairments is a more limited degree 
of access to the good life. Indeed, this designation might communicate something similar to the 
disability that we often associate with other impairments. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1 
there is a great deal of debate about whether disability always leads to disadvantage. In the 
section devoted to this subject I suggested that in most usual cases disability should not lead to 
disadvantage in the long term if society is set up in the proper way. However, if we go by the 






One way of dealing with this issue is to conclude that such exclusions are just part of 
what we commit to when we subscribe to virtue ethics. After all, if the good life is really worth 
working towards it may just be that it will be a goal that is too difficult for some people. Yet, I 
do not think this is the best approach to take, especially since virtue ethics makes these 
conclusions with so little discussion and justification. It is simply not enough to say that the good 
life is difficult and so some people will not be able to attain it. Since the standards used by virtue 
ethics are what create the problem I will show that if we reformulate the standards on which we 
build virtue ethics we can develop a picture of the good life that is more inclusive but also still 
promotes the type of life valued by virtue ethics.  
X) SALVAGING THE GOOD LIFE: REFORMULATING VIRTUE ETHICS 
 One of the first ways we could ―reformulate‖ virtue ethics so to speak is to discard virtue 
as an unhelpful account from the beginning and look for other values on which to base a good 
human life. After all, by stepping away from virtue’s emphasis on practical rationality altogether 
and building a new picture of the good life we would be able to avoid the problems that plague 
virtue ethics with respect to intellectually impaired agents. Yet, given that virtue ethics has many 
assets as a rich account of the good life it is worth seeking other less drastic solutions that allow 
us to retain a virtue based approach while being more inclusive.  
We could also reform this theory by saying that people with intellectual impairments are 
a category
85
 unto themselves with different aims and goals. By saying that people with rational 
impairments are just a different sort of person than the rest of us we would solve the problem by 
being able to come up with a different good life for these people to live. By making them, as it 
were, a separate category of person we would be able to come up with a list of standards for 
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them alone and develop a different good life from these norms. This would mean that while they 
still would not live up to the norms of virtue ethics they could have their own good and happy 
life so that this would not matter as much. 
 Yet, this creates problems of its own as there is such a spectrum of impaired persons. As 
soon as we create a list of norms for one place on the spectrum they will already be too much or 
too little for someone in another location. After all, the needs of a high functioning person with 
autism and the needs of a person in a vegetative state are so diverse that it is almost impossible to 
come up with a list of norms that works equally well for both cases. Without creating a smaller 
version of the exclusion problems we see in the conventional virtue ethics we cannot take this 
option as our solution. 
 Another solution to this problem is just to agree that people with rational impairments are 
unable to reach the happy life that we expect of other agents. This conclusion is likely 
disappointing for people who advocate for full lives for impaired persons. By saying that a life 
like those of average persons is not open to the intellectually impaired we are giving up on the 
idea that with enough help and support these people can attain fully good lives. Given that the 
hope of a good life for the disabled is what fuels many advocates and care givers this conclusion 
will be unsatisfying for many.  
However, this position could be worth adopting as it might just encapsulate the nature of 
disability in a relevant way. After all, the main reason we talk about impairments it that they 
limit a person’s flourishing. By saying they are impaired we are acknowledging that there will be 
things that are hard or impossible for this person to do given that they are unable to perform 





that their lives will not always be as excellent or easy as is possible for the average person. 
Therefore, we often feel compelled to help them improve the life that is open to them since we 
know they will never attain a life like the one most of us enjoy.  
 Yet, if we take this position we need to deal with the fact that in virtue ethics people who 
are unable to be virtuous and live the good life in this sense are unable to attain the fullest level 
of moral goodness. Although this does not by default make them ―bad‖ it does exempt them 
from being fully good.  Since we also do not want to blame people for their impairments this 
seems like a consequence of virtue ethics that we do not wish to hang on to. In some cases it 
might say what we want it to say but it does this in a way that is not altogether accurate. It is this 
issue that is the problem for virtue ethics.  
 To avoid all of the pitfalls of the above solutions by the end of this work I will develop a 
reformulation of the standards of virtue ethics which will apply not just to those with 
impairments but to every human being. By developing this solution I will not only solve the 
problem of exclusivity that is the focus of this work but also develop a stronger  version of virtue 
ethics that makes this approach a more attractive account of the good life not just for people with 
impairments but also for agents in general. Therefore, this solution should be seen as a friendly 











CHAPTER 3: REDEEMING VIRTUE ETHICS WITH BROADER 
STANDARDS 
The problems virtue ethics creates for people with rational disabilities make it seem like 
we should abandon virtue ethics as a moral theory. After all, if a theoretical framework cannot 
accommodate a variety of agents using this framework can only ever be a limited way of 
approaching the world and the good life. Additionally, it is not just disabled agents who fall short 
of the standards of virtue ethics. Average agents also have problems with their rational abilities 
some of the time. Therefore, we may have more reason to abandon virtue ethics than to repair it 
given that its standards present so many problems for agents of all abilities.  
 Yet, as I have mentioned in my introduction this problem with the status and involvement 
of people with rational or intellectual disabilities in ethics is not unique to virtue ethics. Since 
reason and rational thinking are part of the assumptions we make about the good life every major 
ethical theory has problems with what to do about people with serious rational impairments. In 
all cases these agents are just not enough like the ideal agents the theory was developed to 
govern and as such do not live up to the emphasised standards. Therefore, by simply seeking out 
another theory we carry this problem over to another context rather than finding a solution for it.  
 There are also many reasons to keep the virtues as part of our view on the good life. 
Indeed, the biggest asset of virtue ethics is that it looks at the whole person and their whole life 
when assessing moral value. By looking globally at how the agent’s feelings and dispositions 
work towards a happy life this account considers more aspects of the agent as a whole than 
competing accounts do. Given its sensitivity to emotion, judgment, and disposition and the role 
they play in moral life virtue ethics still holds many benefits as a moral theory and so should not 





 We should therefore take a second look at the virtues and see if there is a way for virtue 
ethics to accommodate agents with serious rational impairments. Given its emphasis on reason, 
the standards used by virtue ethics threatens to create a picture of the human being that is heavily 
rationalistic and not inclusive of impaired agents. In what follows I will lay out alternative 
standards of virtue that will allow this account to include a greater variety of agents. By retaining 
the global approach of virtue ethics but not its specific standards we keep what is beneficial 
about this account and avoid the narrowness that limits its scope of application.  
 These new standards are intended to apply to all agents and not just those with rational 
impairments. As previously mentioned developing standards for impaired agents alone is a 
thoroughly wrongheaded idea. This approach of setting these agents apart underestimates the 
degree to which average agents share characteristics with their impaired and disabled 
counterparts. Average agents often have less severe periods of many of the same problems with 
their reason as is common for agents who are impaired. Therefore, average agents can benefit 
from a new set of standards every bit as much as impaired agents can. The failure of overly 
rationalistic accounts of the good life in the case of agents with serious intellectual disabilities 
forces us to reconsider the plausibility of these accounts for agents who do not have such 
disabilities as well. What emerges from considering the application of virtue ethics to intellectual 
disability is a new understanding of the relevant standards for the abled and disabled alike and a 
move away from the rationalistic focus common to the original formulations of virtue ethics.  
 It is these new standards for virtue ethics that I will be defending in this chapter. By 
engaging with how Martha Nussbaum has redeemed Rawlsian contractualism in the face of 
similar problems I will refocus the virtues so that they have a more global focus than the reason 





perfect solution it nevertheless presents a richer and more global picture of the good life which is 
a better account of human nature than the original reason based standards.  
I) NUSSBAUM AND THE CREATION OF ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS 
 As mentioned in the introduction Nussbaum encounters a very similar problem, since the 
Rawlsian Contractualism she engages with can be every bit as rationalistic as virtue ethics in its 
view on human identity. Because of the problems she sees with the Original Position’s 
assumption of rationality, Nussbaum creates a new image of the human being that is the starting 
point of a new contractualist ethics. This is her capabilities-based approach to ethics. Although 
she makes it clear that she is stressing this norm simply as a political construct to aid the 
development of ethics and not as some deeper picture of the human being, her approach is 
valuable and can be altered slightly to be the standards for virtue ethics norm that I am seeking.
86
  
 Indeed, it is important to note that many of the same capabilities highlighted by 
Nussbaum are also highlighted in documents such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
87
 Given that we often see these 
documents as statements about what rights are inherent in a human being this picture of the 
human being can be easily developed into ethical standards and starting points.  
 Nussbaum calls the items that make up the human being as ―capabilities‖ and calls this 
the capability approach to ethics. She begins with capabilities for things like life, health, and the 
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integrity of the body as some of the most basic things a human being is able to do. 
Fundamentally, we are all able to live and we all seek out things like health and integrity of the 
body. She then adds that human beings are capable of sense, imagination, and thought as the next 
layer of this approach. By highlighting the processes of the human mind she points to yet another 
layer of capacities we expect dignified human beings to have.
88
 
 She then notes that emotion, attachment, affiliation, and community are also capabilities 
of human beings given our intensely social nature. It is these capabilities that allow us to have 
such complex and fulfilling social lives. She also adds that human beings are capable of practical 
reason and control over their environment. With this type of wisdom we are able to make 
decisions about our lives and to control the things around us. Finally, she adds that we are also 
capable of play as part of what makes up the life of a dignified human being.
89
 
 Properly modified, this approach of focusing on human capabilities can serve as the basis 
of an account of flourishing that can be employed by virtue ethics in a way that does not 
improperly exclude those with intellectual impairments. Yet, it should be remembered that here 
again Nussbaum notes these ideas a capabilities of a human being and not as a hard and fast set 
of skills. These are things that human beings are capable of but this does not mean that they 
always are able to do them. Therefore, this approach should be modified as a flexible list of 
possible virtues and not as a hard and fast list of what a human being must be. In what follows I 
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will modify this list of capabilities into virtue and also show how this solves the above problem 
of the narrow focus of virtue ethics.  
A)THE NEEDS OF THE ORGANISM 
 As mentioned Nussbaum begins with the capabilities of life, health, and bodily integrity. 
90
 Fundamentally a human being is capable of being a living being who desires health and bodily 
integrity in order to continue this living status. Given that the norm that underpins the virtues is 
supposed to be a set of standards for the ultimate good of the human being, this cluster is a good 
place to start when remaking our standards also. Fundamentally, all the things that virtue ethics 
asks of people would be nigh on impossible if they did not have life, health, and integrity of the 
body. 
 What we can take from this is that these things are a necessary part of the kind of life 
human beings want. Since nothing can be done to promote this sort of a good life without them 
they are the most fundamental desire of a human being and the very foundation of attaining our 
ultimate ends for those who seek this kind of good life. Nussbaum intends to introduce these as 
part of a vision of society where we ensure that every person has access to these basic 
capabilities. However, given the relationship between these fundamental needs of the human 
body as the locus for every human action these should ground any plausible account of human 
flourishing that can be of use to virtue ethics.
91
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Having highlighted this part of the new species norm one might wonder what virtues 
could be associated with life, health and bodily integrity. After all, these are not things that even 
seemed worthy of mentioning in the original rationally focus norm. However, if we think about 
re-emphasizing virtues which are already present in our understanding of virtue we could see 
how things like self-respect and the maintenance of the body could act as virtues that would 
emphasize and support this standard. By valuing traits of character that allow us to value our 
bodies in the way this part of the norm suggests we create virtues which are in line with a 
standard for virtue ethics with a wider focus. 
Given that the original goal of this thesis is to create a picture of virtues that contribute to 
a good life that is attainable for people with rational disabilities, we must examine how the above 
idea of virtues that promote the health of the body would work for people with rational 
disabilities. Obviously, there will be some cases where a person is so strongly disabled that they 
are unable to do these things themselves to any significant degree. A person with a very severe 
developmental disability or who is in a vegetative state will be able to learn how to care for 
themselves in the way the above virtue suggest.  
However, for other people on the spectrum of disability they are able to learn about their 
own personal care, and the value of their life as a person. Indeed, we teach many of these things 
to people with Downs Syndrome, developmental disabilities, and autism on a regular basis. By 
teaching them life skills and instilling in them and need to care for their person we try to give 
them a better chance of survival on their own. Given that these programs are often successful by 







denoting this care for the body as a virtue we would create something that leads to the good life 
that would be more attainable for people with rational disabilities.  
Although this virtue is rather basic it cannot be underestimated how much the health and 
integrity of the body affects the rest of our life and our happiness. One need only talk to a person 
with chronic pain or chronic illness to understand how important health is. After all, without our 
bodies we can do nothing.  The overly intellectualized norms of traditional virtue ethics can 
easily overlook this critical fact of embodiment as part of the same narrow focus that excludes 
disabled agents. By having virtues that relate to the body we not only create virtues that are more 
accessible but we also create a stronger standard in virtue ethics that encompasses more of our 
human identity.  
B)THE NEEDS OF THE MIND 
 Nussbaum also introduces the idea that sense, imagination, and thought are basic 
capabilities of the human being.
92
 After having established that humans are the type of being that 
want to keep living in a way that allows for integrity and healthy functioning of the body we now 
have reference to the fact that good human lives are composed of more than just a body. Our 
sensory impressions of the world and the way our minds interact with these impressions are part 
of what makes our lives interesting and good. This life of the mind may not be fully rational but 
it allows us to use our mind to create an understanding of the world that is complex and 
interesting. It is this additional dimension of human living that enriches human life with another 
level of flourishing.  
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 Given that being able to think about the world with our sensory impressions of it are such 
enriching parts of human life this capability should be fully included in the standards for virtue 
ethics. With virtues like creativity and imagination we can recognize this world of the mind as 
both something that enriches human life and also as a foundation for rational thinking. After all, 
without the complex way of using the mind to engage with the world listed above the mind lacks 
anything to reason about.  
 Here again, there will be cases where learning about the world will be only minimally 
possible for people with rational disabilities. However, arguably there is a sense in which most 
people
93
 are able to learn about the world in at least some capacity. To a person with a lower IQ 
or a developmental disability things like learning how to ride the subway or what happens when 
it rains could be incredibly fulfilling. It is true that the above life of the mind will not always be 
as elevated and complex as the original standards of virtue would demand. After all, in 
comparison to how an average person can use their mind to interact with the world the 
intellectual life of a rationally disabled person will often be objectively impoverished.  
Here I am not trying to negate the fact that rational disabilities hinder the creation of an 
intellectual life by nature. However, given that, as noted in Chapter 1, a disability does not 
always need to disadvantage a person’s quality of life in the long run the above idea of still 
expecting virtues that promote a intellectual life of every agent points to the fact that even if a 
person has diminished intellectual capacities they can still have a satisfying life, by their 
standards, if they foster the life of the mind that is open to them. This may not be as complex or 
elevated as what another agent will achieve but it will still improve the life of the individual 
agent and bring them closer to flourishing. Therefore, this standard is a helpful addition to the 
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new standards of virtue ethics because it speaks to yet another facet of a flourishing and varied 
human life.  
C) THE EMOTIVE AND ATTACHED BEING 
 Nussbaum also mentions that emotion, attachment, affiliation, and community are key 
parts of the human being. 
94
 On the surface this seems very similar to Aristotle’s idea that 
friendship is critical to a happy life. Indeed, Aristotle even goes so far as to say that a truly happy 
life is impossible without true friendship.
95
 Yet, what Nussbaum is pointing to with the above 
capabilities is a style of relationship that is less rationally focused that Aristotle’s idea of true 
friends being people who have a common rational life of contemplating the good.
96
 Since both 
Nussbaum's and my revised standards for virtue ethics are not so narrowly focused on reason as 
conventional virtue ethics accounts the value of relationships stressed by Aristotle’s friendship 
can be retained without exclusively insisting on this rationalized component.  
In this new set of standards human beings are still Aristotle’s ―political animal‖. 
However, since reason is not the only focus these relationships can have a richer focus. Instead 
here we can focus on virtues such as attachment, compassion, mercy, and community belonging 
as key parts of this relationality. It was the focus on reason in his account that lead Aristotle and 
those who followed him to see intellectual friendship as key to a happy life. When we remove 
this exclusive focus on reason we are able to create a richer and more accessible approach to 
human relationships where it is the relationship its self that matters and not just its focus.  
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 This idea that human beings are by nature designed for relationship is also central not 
only in Nussbaum but also to the ethical norm proposed by Jean Vanier in ―Becoming Human‖.
97
 
In this work he develops the idea that we need to move away from our society's competitive 
ideals as they create a lot of ―woundedness‖
98
 and loneliness in the world. He suggests that by 
moving towards the norm where community and our love for others is the most important thing 
in our lives we can move to a norm of relationship that avoids this loneliness and brokenness for 
both average and impaired individuals.
99
 
 Indeed, Vanier created this focus on human relational abilities to provide inclusive lives 
for people with intellectual impairments. He observed firsthand how our focus on the life of the 
mind, reason and the ability to compete with others excluded the intellectually impaired from 
having lives of purpose. It is this exclusion that creates much of the loneliness and woundedness 
that pervades the lives of these people. However, average agents can also fall victim to this 
exclusion and its effects if they are not able to use their minds in as strong a way as those around 
them. Given this direct focus on the intellectually impaired and their exclusion from the ideal of 
a good life it would seem like Vanier’s work should be the core of any new norm of virtue ethics 
as he is seeking to solve the same over emphasis on reason as is found in virtue ethics.  
 Although Vanier has very good reasons for stressing community and relationship, when 
we focus on just one characteristic of a human being we run the risk of creating a standard that is 
too narrowly focused on one part of human identity. Since one part of human life will never 
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encompass who we are as a whole my revised standards of virtue ethics created here will include 
Vanier’s ideas about human relationships. However, they will not be given pride of place as to 
move away from emphasising reason above all else only to do so with a different human 
characteristic would be to move from one narrow focus to another rather than correcting this 
problem of scope completely.  
Although the standard of community and the social virtues of mercy, concern for others, 
and attachment that are associated with it will not be all of the new standard for virtue ethics this 
standard does have a place in the remaking of virtue ethics. After all, even people with very 
global impairments like developmental disabilities, Downs Syndrome, or Prader-Willi syndrome  
are able to form at least some relationship and attachment with those around them. Even if we 
cannot speak every human being is capable of at least some level of relationship. This may be 
easier for someone with Downs Syndrome than it would be with someone who has a disability 
that affects their relational skills. However, even in such cases relationships are possible and can 
enrich the life of the person forming them. 
An objection to relationship as an accessible virtue is that often the relationships of 
people with impairments and those around them are based most centrally on dependence. 
Fundamentally the impaired person is often dependent on others to help them live and function. 
For example, someone who needs a worker to help him or her grocery shop has a relationship 
with that person. However, given that this is not a relationship by choice it does not meet the 
ideal of full friendship between equals in virtue, since the impaired person must have this 
relationship weather they choose to or not. After all, the goal with virtue is not just some sort of 





This objection is valid in the sense that relationships of dependence are not cases of 
complete virtue. Yet, it is often also the case that if they had access to their peers people with 
impairments could still form meaningful and virtue-based relationships at their own level. Too 
often their loneliness and isolation except for their care givers is a disadvantage from their 
society rather than their impairment. For example, it is not the case that people with Downs 
Syndrome  or autism are all unable to form relationship with other people who can connect with 
them. It is more often the case that they live in situations where they do not have the opportunity 
or tools to do so. Therefore, what should be sought out here are relationships with people that 
allow an impaired person to have real virtue based relationships that are not all about 
dependence.  
D)PRACTICAL REASON 
The next standard in need of revision is the same practical reason which is emphasized in 
the original standard used by virtue ethics.
100
 It may seem strange to keep the very norm which 
causes so many of the problems in the original formulation. Yet, the new standards for virtue 
ethics created in this work are not intended to say that practical reason is not important or that it 
never has a role in a happy human life. Rather, in the original formulation of virtue ethics places 
to much emphasis on too narrow a conception of reason, and so leads to a narrow and 
impoverished image of a good human life.  
Practical reasoning is a central part of the good human life. Being able to reason about 
things and make decisions is an important and essential human task. Creating a standard that 
does not take this into account would be inadequate given that reason has so much to offer us. 
Therefore, practical reasoning should still be a part of the standards of virtue ethics. Yet, while it 
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is an important part of virtue it is no more important than any of the other parts in the sense that 
at different times different virtues will be required to promote a happy and flourishing life. By 
avoiding putting too much emphasis on practical reason we avoid the narrow scope that plagues 
original formulations of virtue ethics. Just like the relationality discussed above practical reason 
will be some of what virtue is but it is not everything we need for a good human life.  
Given that practical reason is still part of virtue ethics, traditional virtues such as 
prudence and wisdom will come into play. In contrast to the above set of relational virtues 
practical reason is more difficult to accomplish for agents with rational disabilities. However, 
given the importance of practical reason to human life leaving this type of virtue out would not 
be presenting the diverse and widely focused good life I am advocating. While this does create 
problems for impaired agents they will be solved with other parts of the new standards for virtue 
ethics discussed later on in this work.  
E)ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 
Another criterion for a good life listed by Nussbaum is the idea that we desire control 
over our environment.
101
 Although Nussbaum lists this criterion in a place that is far separate 
from the above idea of practical reason this idea of control over one's environment highlights 
some of the things in the original formulation of practical reason in a very different way. By 
emphasizing that we human beings desire to control our own lives and the environment around 
us this norm emphasizes that we wish to live in ways that are deliberate and developed by us. We 
wish to be autonomous players in our own story rather than passive observers carried along by 
the tide of our lives.  
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Given that living the good life and being able to form ones character almost always 
involve some degree of control over one's environment it is important to include this criterion as 
part of our standard for virtue. By being able to control our environment we are able to increase 
our chances of being able to live the good life. While complete control is never possible for any 
agent being able to foster at least some level of environmental control is critical to having a good 
life.  
The virtue of autonomy and appropriate decision making are incredibly difficult for 
agents in general. However, they become even more difficult for those with rational impairments 
given that in many cases such people live lives that are almost wholly governed by others who 
care for them. Therefore, it might seem like control over ones environment is not a virtue at all 
but rather something that is provided to us by other people.  
However, the importance of autonomy and making one’s own choices as part of a good 
life cannot be underestimated. In his work on autism and autonomy DeVidi argues that people 
with autism (and one could expand this to include others with rational impairments) should be 
given as much choice as possible in terms of how their lives are set up. Although his work 
focuses most centrally on the issue of autism and autonomy, DeVidi’s work also provides a 
picture of how people with impairments can and should have control over their own environment 
with the appropriate assistance.  
DeVidi describes how people interested in the welfare of persons with autism often use a 
variety of frameworks to help these people make decisions about things in their lives like who 
they live with and how their whole environment will be composed. DeVidi stresses that although 





be them making the decision.
102
 For example, care givers are encouraged to monitor what they 
know of a person and assess if an answer to a question is really what the person wants or whether 
it is really environmental factors affecting them. By ensuring that the person is not pressured into 
making a decision that they do not really want to make care givers help this person to have 
autonomy and control over their own environment.  
DeVidi stresses that this assistance does not mean that the person is not exerting their 
own decision making abilities. Indeed, he points out that average agents often require similar 
assistance when trying to make the right decisions. For example, DeVidi recounts the example of 
his wife who enlists the help of the members of her family in order to avoid eating too many 
chocolate chips. DeVidi stresses that no one would say that his wife is not being autonomous 
even though she enlists help to make the right decisions. From this DeVidi argues that in the 
same way as his wife is still autonomous when she has help making decisions she knows are 
right for her, so too people with autism (and one could easily say other impairments also) are still 
being autonomous even if they have assistance in making choices.
103
 
It is this image of assisted environmental control that is most helpful with respect to 
people with disabilities and the virtues. In the original account of virtue any case where someone 
needed to be assisted to perform an action would not be virtue. After all, if they need help to do 
the right thing then they must not possess that virtue to a sufficient degree to really exercise it. 
However, when we take out the emphasis on practical reason and wisdom and look at each of the 
virtues separately we can see that with assistance people with autism are displaying stable 
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characteristic dispositions to exercise reason in making decisions. Since the people who assist 
them are not making the choices for them or directing them towards one particular choice it is 
still the person making the decision and thus still their dispositions that drive this process. 
Therefore, although these people are being assisted in the decisions that would form their 
character they are nevertheless involved in displaying dispositions of their own accord and thus 
are eligible to attain virtues associated with environmental control.
104
 
Here again this assisted decision-making process will not be possible for all persons with 
disabilities. There will be some cases where individuals with disabilities are not endowed with 
enough cognitive functioning to make decisions about their own environment even with 
assistance. However, if we are sensitive to the spectrum we can see that just like average people 
with the proper support there are a great number of people with impairments and disabilities who 
would be able to develop their decision-making skills and their control of their own environment 
and thus exercise the virtues associated with environmental control. 
F) PLAY AND JOY IN THE GOOD LIFE 
The final criterion from Nussbaum is the idea that play as a key part of the good life.
105
 
This idea is not present in the old standards of virtue ethics but is a beneficial addition to the new 
formulation.  The idea that human beings play and can do things purely for the joy of doing them 
seems to encompass some of the happiness and ease of living that we would think would 
accompany a good life.
106
 Although we must understand that the good life will not be happy and 
easy all of the time the idea that play and the enjoyment of the task can be included in our very 
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standards for virtue encompasses the idea that fundamentally our goal in following the virtues is 
to create a happy life for ourselves. While it may not always be pleasant we would hope that this 
happy life would make a somehow better off than other alternative lives. The joy that comes 
from play could be part of this being better off.  
It should be noted that play is certainly something that is not always heavily rational as 
the idea of the good life were in the original standards of virtue ethics. Play is often nonsensical 
as people do something simply because it pleases them. While it is true that some kinds of play 
like chess or games of strategy do involve the mind in more complex ways this kind of play is 
not the only kind of play. Traditional virtue ethics would hold that play that involves the mind is 
somehow objectively better than other kinds of play.  Yet, since we are already moving away 
from this narrow rational standard this idea need not be a given in terms of our standards for 
play.  
Thus, we can include play and the character traits like humour, joy, and fairness that 
promote it in our new set of standards for a happy life. As a non-rational activity for the most 
part this idea of play can help us to move away from the narrow rational focus of the 
conventional virtue ethics . While it is true that there will still be people like those who are in a 
permanent vegetative state for whom play is not possible this idea of play and the virtues that 
support it provides a less rational path to the good life and the joy that can come with it.  
II) A REVISED NOTION OF FLOURISHING 
 Given that on the original account the virtues are so closely tied to the notion of 
flourishing one might wonder what flourishing would look like in this account. After all, even if 
we take these revised virtues as the new goals for human life it looks like we run into some of the 





seek excellence in everything in order to flourish. If we make this high level of excellence our 
goal in this case then we would go right back to having an account of the good life that uses such 
high standards that it excludes agents who are impaired in some area of their functioning.  
 Yet, as will be explained later on in this thesis there are many ways in which average 
agents also have a hard time living up to the standards of virtue ethics. After all, in any 
formulation of virtue ethics that involves any sort of excellence or flourishing there will be cases 
where even the most capable average agent falls short of this standard. Therefore, as will be 
discussed below, if it is a problem to require a given standard of anyone who  might fail to meet 
it perfectly then we will have difficulty requiring standards of agents at all. 
 In light of this issue then we are still able to say that even with this revised account of the 
virtues flourishing will be exemplified in attaining a level of excellence in terms of having the 
above set virtues as part of one’s character in relevant ways. There will certainly be places where 
impaired agents are unable to live up to this high standard for the good life. However, given that 
this can also be said of other average agents we can still use this same standard in relation to the 
lives we expect of impaired agents in relation to this revised set of virtues. We just need to 
understand that in some places agents will fall short of this standard of excellence. However, this 
is more a reflection of the nature of agents than it is a problem for my account.  
III) IMPAIRMENT: A PERSISTENT PROBLEM 
Given that the above account provides standards for a good life that emphasis things 
other than an exclusive focus on a narrow conception of reason, it is a more accessible 
alternative to the norm usually associated with virtue ethics. Given that less intellectual 
functioning is needed to live up to this norm a greater range of agents will be able to live up to 





reasoning is still needed in some cases now there are other good things that are a part of the good 
life that people can aspire to. Practical reason is still important but now it is just one of many 
things needed for a good life.  
However, even this greater range of virtues and the greater range of accessibility they 
provide cannot change the fact, as mentioned above, that there are still some things on this list 
that will not be attainable by every agent. For example, a person with Downs Syndrome and a 
lower IQ may not be able to use practical reason even to the degree that the above revised 
standard demands. Similarly, things like emotional attachment and the community that is 
stressed by the above norm may not be possible for people who have disorders like autism that 
are characterized by limited emotions. Indeed, arguably all of these things will be almost 
completely inaccessible to people who are at the lowest end of the spectrum in a persistent 
vegetative state. 
Therefore, although my above list of norms does solve the problem of accessibility for a 
greater range of agents and does allow for more people with impairments to have at least a 
minimum level of virtue it is still important to note that we encounter the problem that there will 
just be some people who are completely unable to possess the dispositions needed for even this 
good life. More moderately, there will always be agents whose abilities simply prevent them 
from doing the majority of the things on this list. Since they may not be able to develop many of 
these things it would seem like they are not able to have a very good life by the terms of virtue 
ethics. 
Although this seems like a problem perhaps this is as it should be. As mentioned above, if 





people have difficulty attaining a traditionally good life. After all, though we don't want to say 
the disability automatically sets people up for a life of disadvantage one cannot deny that having 
abilities that are different from those of the average individual makes it much more difficult to do 
things generally expected of us as human beings. Therefore, there are some ways in which the 
above conclusion about even a modified set of virtues is inevitable. Unless we are to severely 
alter the construct of disability and make it meaningless it is just part of the very concept of a 
disability that there are things they cannot do that non-disabled people can. Therefore, there will 
always be some virtues that are out of reach, and therefore some aspects of the good life that are 
not fully accessible.  
Yet, I would also like to note that there is an answer to this issue that is often overlooked 
in the sense that if the above norm is inaccessible to those with disabilities there are also a great 
many cases where it is inaccessible to average individuals. As DeVidi points out in his work on 
autism and autonomy often times the very visible nature of disabilities like autism make it very 
easy for us to focus on the differences between an average person and a person with autism.
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For example, the fact that a person with autism may be unable to speak and find it uncomfortable 
to make eye contact with other people makes it very easy for us to see these outward markers and 
then label them as someone completely different from ourselves. This is also true with other 
disorders and disabilities. Since outward markers are so strongly visible we tend to focus on 
them as a way of understanding this construct. However, throughout his work DeVidi makes a 
valuable point about the similarities between average individuals and persons with disabilities. 
This is clear in how he approaches the example of his wife and her use of assistive strategies to 
avoid the chocolate chips discussed above. As mentioned DeVidi’s wife is a generally average 
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individual in her abilities. However, in the case of her weakness for chocolate chips she knows 
that she will not be able to do the task alone and so enlist the help of her family members to 
remain committed to her good health.
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DeVidi then goes on to mention that many of the coping strategies his wife uses to avoid 
eating chocolate chips are very similar to the strategies used by people with autism and other 
disabilities to avoid doing behaviours that cause them harm or in a more positive sense to be able 
to perform behaviours that they need to do in order to have a fulfilling life. By using this analogy 
between his wife and people with disabilities DeVidi shows that there are many ways in which 
we are very similar to people with impairments and disabilities in the sense that we all have 
moments where our abilities are not what we would like them to be or are somehow weakened 
by the situation. 
Other examples are cases where our mind or body is impaired for a short period of time. 
For example, in cases where we are very ill or have injured ourselves our skill level may be 
diminished to such a degree that our skills would be very similar to people who regularly have a 
disability. To make this applicable to my context of rational disabilities, we can note cases where 
events in our lives mean that our minds do not function the way they normally would. When we 
are ill, injured or simply over tired we are often unable, if only for a short period of time, to 
function in many of the ways that would be required by even the revised standard of virtues. 
What both the example used by DeVidi and my own examples above show us is that if 
the norms of virtue ethics are a problem for disabled agents they are certainly a problem for the 
rest of us also. Although there is a difference in degree there is no denying that if our response to 
                                                             
108





people with disabilities being unable to do many of the things listed in the above list of virtues is 
to throw the virtues out entirely then arguably we should not have bothered with the virtues in 
the first place. There are so many reasons why average agents are impaired from time to time, so 
if we are really looking for a norm that always includes every agent then we are always going to 
be slightly disappointed. The virtues, by their very nature, are an aspirational ideal that few, if 
any, fully reach. 
Given that any list of virtues is always going to be slightly unattainable one might 
wonder why we should bother with the virtues at all. After all, it might seem odd to insist that the 
good life depends on the attainment of characteristics that few if any can fully achieve, at least if 
these are presented as standards that are intended to be action-guiding. After all, if we know that 
the virtues are largely difficult to attain from the beginning it seems strange to ask such a high 
standard of people. 
This problem has been encountered and discussed by many people who promote virtue 
ethics. There have been many different responses to this problem but perhaps Hursthouse says it 
best when she says that the virtues are difficult because living a good life is difficult.
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  Since 
the virtues encapsulate what is like to live the good life if the good life is difficult then the 
virtues must be also. However, this answer might still be cold comfort for people who are 
wondering why we should ask such a high standard of people when we know that even average 
agents will not be able to fulfill the standard all of the time. This seems like an incredibly 
frustrating project even when we know that the good life is difficult from the start.  
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IV) THE SOLUTION 
 What will solve this problem is to remember that in its essence virtue ethics is an 
aspirational account. As Hursthouse reminds us living well is difficult and the virtues are far 
from an easy plan for a good life. Instead the virtues are designed to be an ultimate goal for us to 
aspire to so as to make our character and our lives better. Although the composition of this life 
changes depending on our external commitments what is certain here is that virtue ethics is not 
intended to be an easy how-to description of good human beings. It is rather a difficult and 
complex aspirational account that describes things that would make the human being most 
perfectly happy. 
Knowing then that the virtues are an aspirational account we are able to develop a 
solution for the fact that both average and impaired agents will often be unable to attain the 
virtues to varying degrees. Here we must simply understand that not every person will be able to 
attain virtue perfectly. However, every person will be able to find a role where they can at least 
make an attempt at virtue. 
There will be different roles open to different human beings and, given our abilities, we 
will be able to attain virtues to different degrees. In the case of impairment and disability it will 
simply be the case that people with rational disabilities will be less able to attain some of the 
virtues than average individuals. Equally, there will be cases where average individuals have 
their reason impaired by some factor in their lives and will be unable to attain virtue for a short 
period of time. However, what can be suggested for both of these cases is that the agent in 
question should do the best they can with the situation they have. By attempting to attain virtue 
even knowing that we may never be able to attain a perfectly we are still able to make our lives 





It should be noted that even with this solution there is a tension between wanting to 
include more agents in the moral life prescribed by virtue ethics and keeping the aspirational 
quality of virtue ethics. On the one hand virtue ethics would say that this ―try your best‖ 
approach is not enough as only a truly good life is the best goal. On the other hand people who 
advocate for the status of the disabled will not be happy with this account as even with moving 
away from a rational standard for virtue and giving the virtues a new and broader focus we still 
have an account that does not always work for people with disabilities. 
Yet, unless we are to abandon the virtues entirely or return to the overly narrow reason 
based standards promoted by the original version of virtue ethics we must be satisfied by this 
account. After all, we must have a balance between a meaningful account and one that is 
inclusive. Therefore, it will always be the case that some people will not be able to live up to the 
standards of a good life. Yet, this is really more a fact of the differences in peoples’ skills and 
life styles than a flaw in the theory. There will always be some people who cannot live up to 
even the best moral standards and this is just how the world is.  
V) THE VALUE OF A REVISED NORM 
Given that even this solution does not always fully include all people it would seem like 
we could have just stayed with the original formulation of virtue ethics and saved ourselves the 
time of modifying the virtues as I have done above. After all, if we are simply to say that we 
need to do the best we can with the virtues since none of us will ever be perfect it seems like the 
original rationally focus norm of virtue would have been perfectly acceptable if we are to take 
this line. It could seem rather strange to clarify our standards but still retain the idea that they are 





Yet, the account provided above is an important modification as it encompasses more of 
what we expect from human beings than the original narrow rational standard allows. By taking 
into account the many varieties of human lives that are open people with impairments we are 
able to create a wider picture of what makes for a good human life. By understanding that there 
is more to human life than simply our reason we are able to create a picture of a good life and the 
virtues that is richer and more developed than the original rationally focused norm. Although this 
picture was originally created to include people with rational disabilities in our understanding of 
virtue by understanding the similarities between agents with impairments and people we consider 
average we can come to a greater understanding of what is to be a human being in a much more 
holistic sense than the original rationally focus norm. By re-focusing our idea of the good life we 
are able to develop a new idea of the good life that is open to the disabled and average alike.  
VI) SUMMARY 
In conclusion, by drawing on the work of Martha Nussbaum we can develop an 
understanding of human nature which is much more inclusive and sensitive to the many different 
things that make us human. By moving away from the narrow rational norm that was used by 
virtue ethics in the past we can create a new species norm that both solves the problem of the 
exclusion of people with rational disabilities from the original construct of virtue ethics and also 
creates an understanding of virtue ethics that is richer and more varied in terms of what we can 
expect from the good life of an average agent. 
Although there will still be cases where both disabled and average agents will be unable 
to live up to the standards placed upon them by even these modified virtues it is important to 
note that virtue is an aspirational account. By using this advanced picture of what a human being 





good life that we should ultimately be having. Although these aspirations will often be more 
difficult for people with impairments and disabilities it should be noted that in both the cases of 
people who are impaired regularly and in the case of average agents who often experience 
impairments at various points in their lives trying to attain a modified set of the virtues is at least 






















With the first chapter of this work I hope to have shown that although disability and 
impairment are difficult to define and parse out by working with the definitions provided by the 
World Health Organization, Martha Nussbaum we can at least pin down some of what 
disabilities and impairments are in practice. While this still leaves us with questions about the 
relation of the disability to things like the person’s self or to the disadvantage they might 
experience by examining each of these questions in turn we can develop further our idea of 
disability and impairment as part of how people exist in the world.  
As they are generally understood Disabilities and impairments, especially those that 
effect a person’s mind or reason, present a particularly difficult problem with respect to how we 
often envision human beings when we develop systems of ethics. Although this issue with an 
idealized starting point is a problem for all of the major ethical theories this problem runs much 
deeper in virtue ethics. Given that this idea of the good life is rooted in a very exacting set of 
standards the fact that this norm does not include people with impairments implies that such 
persons are somehow defective or unable to live up to the standards of what we think a human 
being should be. 
 The major part of this set of standards that causes these problems is the fact that a very 
complex sort of practical wisdom is required of people by this norm. Not only are they required 
to perform the right action but they are also supposed to perform this action for the right reasons 
and accompany it with the right sort of emotional responses. Given that there are many people 
with different sorts of impairments that disabled their reason to such a degree that this  process is 
just not possible for them this fact means that there is, from the beginning very little place for 





 Additionally, the type of language use and social life that is seen as a large part of the 
good life by virtue ethics is also out of reach of many people who are impaired. Since a complex 
use of language and complex participation in society is a major part of a virtuous good life some 
impaired persons are excluded from the beginning as they lack the skills to perform such actions. 
Here again, these persons are just not the type of person virtue ethics envisions and so they are 
excluded from the good life this theory proposes. 
 This issue of exclusion is a problem for proponents of virtue ethics because it is very 
strange to think that by virtue of facts about themselves that they cannot control these people 
should be excluded from the good life from the beginning. By not fitting the idea of a human 
being used by virtue ethics these people lack the capacities used in the good life from the 
beginning and so stand very little chance of being able to attain a fully good life. While this does 
not mean that they are ―bad‖ by nature it means they can never be fully good not matter how 
hard they try. 
 While this problem of exclusion is most apparent for people with impairments as I have 
noted above there are many ways in which this issue is also a problem for the rest of us 
―average‖ agents. There are many times in our lives where our own skills and abilities overlap 
with those who are permanently impaired. When we are very young, very old, sick or 
preoccupied by some life event we too are impaired in our reason and do not live up to the 
demands of virtue ethics. Therefore, if impaired persons are to be left out of virtue ethics than it 
stands to reason that most of us will also be excluded at some time or other given the fluctuating 





 Given this fact of temporary exclusion and also the exclusion of people who are impaired 
if we want to keep the image of the good life proposed by virtue ethics we must look for a 
solution that allows us to keep this theory but also to make it more inclusive of people with all 
skill levels. After all, if we are unable to do this we are left with a picture of the good life that is 
either far to exacting to be worthwhile or one that declares a large percentage of the population 
as un fit persons. Since neither of these options are acceptable if we seek inclusion another 
option must be sought out.  
 This is where we can turn to the work of Martha Nussbaum and Jean Vanier to discover a 
new image of the human person that will provide a more accessible good life with virtues that 
can be achieved by a larger section of the population.  By looking at Nussbaum’s capabilities we 
can develop a picture of the human person that still includes many of the things Aristotle and 
other proponents of virtue ethics valued. However, by emphasising not only the fact that we are 
rational animals but also valuing other things that make human live well we are able to develop 
new virtue that encompasses a wider section of the human condition and in turn create a good 
life with a wider focus in general.  
 Yet, even this is not a perfect solution. While this new set of virtue I am emphasising will 
be accessible to more people than was the case in the original theory there is still the issue that 
impairment produces a spectrum of human abilities and deficits that mean that there really will 
be no one action that every person will be able to perform effectively. This is where we must 
recognize that even in this altered from the good life is difficult to attain and that virtue ethics is 






WHAT THIS MIGHT LOOK LIKE IN PRACTICE 
Having provided this theoretical picture of a more inclusive virtue ethics it is reasonable 
to wonder what this might look like in practice. After all, it is all well and good to say that one 
has developed a list of accessible virtues for agents of all skill levels. It is quite another to try and 
imagine what this will look like when put into practice. Indeed, virtue ethics is such that it is 
often easier to discuss the necessary virtues than it is to discover how to put them to work in our 
lives.  
One thing is for certain if this approach is to work there would need to be great care taken 
in the way we care for impaired persons to ensure that although they need assistance in many 
parts of their lives there is still a place for them to make their own decision about how they want 
to live and what sort of person they want to be. Here there would need to be a balance between 
the paternalism that is needed to a certain extent to care for a person who has limited use of 
reason and a margin for choice and even error on the part of the impaired agent. 
A good example of how this might play out is the assisted decision making outlined by 
DeVidi that I have mentioned in several places above. In such cases a group of average agents 
work with an impaired person (in the case DeVidi describes this is usually a person with Autism) 
to support this person in making choices about how they want to live and act in the world. By 
knowing the person with the impairment well and by working closely with them the average 
agents can assist this person in making the decision they really want to make. 
However, if this process is to work with respect to virtue ethics we must be sensitive to 
something DeVidi alludes to in his work. If this is really to be assisted decision making and not 
just paternalistic care providing we must be sure that the desires of the assistants for the person 





mistakes.  By allowing for real decisions and choices about what is the right thing to do on the 
part of a person with an impairment we give them what might be there only chance at having 
enough control of their own lives to attain virtue.  
For example, let’s say we have a case of a woman who has Downs Syndrome. Her 
understanding of the world is limited by her lower than average IQ and also some problems with 
her cause and effect reasoning. This woman and those who support here are faced with a choice. 
Should she save her last pay check for later expense when she knows she will be laid off from 
her job or should she use it to go on a casino trip with her friends.  Perhaps the worst thing that 
could happen here is for this woman’s assistants to make this choice for her. Although they will 
know full well that the casino trip is not the best option if they enforce temperance on this 
woman she misses out on the chance to make a real choice and to form her own character. 
The best thing that could happen here is for the assistants to help this woman weight out 
the options in this case and to support her in making a decision that really comes from her. For 
this to be possible it is critical that she be allowed to choose the casino trip if that is really what 
she thinks is the best option. While the assistants will most certainly coach this woman about 
what is likely to happen if she chooses not to save the money they must also be willing to step 
back when she makes the final choice so that she is actually making the choice to be temperate 
on her own if she does in fact save the money. 
It is this allowance for as much control and choice in the lives of the impaired that will be 
critical for them to be able to attain any sort of virtue. While there will still be a large role for 
average agents to coach and educate agents with lesser powers of reason it will be critical that 





life. Wherever possible every person, weather impaired or not, should be allowed to make as 
may self-directed actions as possible without the threat of paternalistic predefined actions so as 
to be able to shape their own character and the nature of their lives.  
It could very well be asked whether this assisted choice making and coaching as to the 
moral status of a given option allows for true virtue at all. After all, it would seem like if the 
person needs so much assistance to choose an action even if they did choose the action that is in 
line with virtue they will lack the internal states needed for true virtue. Indeed, it would seem 
like the internal states and real reflection would belong to the assistants and not to the person 
themselves. 
Yet, this is where the subtle differences I have mentioned above come in.  It will be 
critical for the people who assist impaired agents to shape their lives to know this agent well 
enough to be able to step back at the proper moment so that although the deliberation was 
assisted the final choice is that of the agent's. Given that this process will still involve a large 
amount of assistance from those around an agent this will likely not be the best or most perfect 
case of the exercise of virtue. However, as I have mentioned above given that this is an 
aspirational project this process will give such agents a better chance at virtue than would have 
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